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 Recent years have seen an upsurge in terrorist activity.  Many studies have 
shown that the United States’ transportation infrastructure is vulnerable to attack.  
This is especially true for bridges.  While the probability of an attack’s occurrence is 
very low, the structural response and consequences could be substantial.  Bridge 
owners need a way to assess the vulnerability of their facilities, in order to make well-
informed decisions regarding risk management and mitigation.  This thesis proposes a 
method to evaluate the effects of a man-made attack using vehicle-bound 
conventional explosives on a highway bridge.  The body of knowledge in 
performance-based seismic design is extended to blasts, using performance criteria to 
characterize structural response.  The expected value of three major consequences is 
estimated:  structural damage, casualties, and downtime.  Probability distributions are 
used throughout to account for uncertainty.  Three case studies apply the proposed 
method to different functional bridge types of an existing long-span bridge.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background 
Terrorism presents a real threat to all aspects of society.  The terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 have shown how devastating a successfully implemented 
attack can be.  In the United States, homeland security has become a priority, one that 
government officials and civilians alike cannot take lightly. 
 In the past few years, the vulnerability of transportation infrastructure to 
terrorism has become evident.  The casual observer might think that since most of the 
U.S. highway system has a natural redundancy, it is not susceptible to an attack.  
However, this is not the case.  Transportation facilities are attractive targets for 
terrorists because they are easily accessible, and an attack could have considerable 
impact on human lives and economic activity.  This is especially true for 
transportation assets such as bridges, which carry traffic through highway network 
meeting points and where alternate routes are not available because of geographic 
constraints. 
Recent terrorist threats have targeted the Golden Gate Bridge and the 
Brooklyn Bridge.  Bridges such as these not only provide transportation between two 
regions, but they also serve as national landmarks.  A successful attack would disrupt 
regional traffic and have severe economic consequences, not to mention cause a blow 
to the United States’ morale.  It is imperative that homeland security procedures 
incorporate bridges, in order to prevent terrorist attacks, as well as minimize the 
impact if one should occur. 
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1.1.1  Risk and Consequence 
Risk is defined as the potential of loss to a system due to the likelihood of an 
event and its consequences.  Risk (R) is the multi-dimensional product of occurrence 
probability (L) and consequences given occurrence (C), as shown in Equation 1.1.  
R = CL×       (1.1) 
In the homeland security field, Equation 1.1 is modified to include a vulnerability 
measure (V), which assesses the likelihood of an attack’s success, given its 
occurrence.  
   R = CVL ××       (1.2) 
The process of risk assessment answers three basic questions: 
 
1. What could occur? 
 
2. How likely is it to occur? 
 
3. What are the consequences if it occurs? 
 
Defining the probability of occurrence, or likelihood, is traditionally based on 
historical data and similar studies.  In the case of natural hazards, such as earthquakes 
and hurricanes, thorough records are kept, so the probabilities of occurrence can be 
estimated for a certain location or geographical region.  However, in the case of 
terrorism, data to estimate likelihood is virtually unavailable.  A terrorist attack could 
occur anywhere, at any time.  The nature of terrorist threats involves a human element 
that cannot be predicted.  Therefore, man-made attacks are characterized as low 
probability, high consequence events.  While an attack’s probability of occurrence is 
very small, difficult to quantify and filled with uncertainty, the consequences in most 
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cases would be devastating.  For these reasons, calculating the value of risk in 
Equation 1.1 or Equation 1.2 does not convey the significance of a terrorist attack and 
its effects.  Instead, using conditional probability theory, more focus can be placed on 
the consequences of an attack, given its occurrence.  That is, the probability of 
consequence, P(C|I), where “C” is the consequences of an attack and “I” is the 
initiating event (e.g. attack scenario).  Conditional probability theory states that P(I) = 
1, and the expected value of consequence costs is denoted E[C]. 
Many studies suggest that analyzing the consequences of terrorist attacks on 
bridges is a necessary area of future research.  Only by having accurate knowledge of 
these consequences can risk management strategies be developed and implemented.   
1.2  Purpose and Scope 
This thesis proposes a method for evaluating the effects of a terrorist attack on 
highway bridges.  The approach uses probability distributions to characterize the 
parameters of the vehicle-bound explosives attack scenario:  magnitude and location.  
Applying Monte Carlo simulation, attack scenarios are randomly generated and the 
equivalent static loads are applied to the bridge’s structural model.  Next, nonlinear 
static analysis is conducted using commercially available structural analysis software.  
Performance criteria, established in performance-based seismic design guidelines, are 
used to measure the structural damage to the bridge.  Finally, the method estimates 
the costs associated with three consequences:  structural damage, casualties, and 
bridge downtime.  Probability distributions account for uncertainty in the 
consequences.  Case studies demonstrate the proposed approach with three functional 
bridge types of an existing long-span bridge:  prestressed concrete beam, continuous 
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steel plate girder, and deck cantilever truss.  The case studies analyze attack scenarios 
to conventional explosives in a vehicle traveling on the bridge. 
 Knowing the effects of a terrorist attack is beneficial to bridge owners, who 
have limited funding for security-related issues.  The bridge owner can use the 
proposed method to analyze one critical bridge or multiple bridges in their inventory.  
Examining the structural responses and consequences of an attack on different 
functional bridge types can shed light on which bridges are most vulnerable.  The 
results of the proposed method can be valuable when bridge owners must decide 
among risk management or mitigation strategies.    
1.3  Document Organization 
This thesis has seven chapters and one supplemental appendix.  Chapter 1 
contains introductory information, which provides important background information, 
as well explains the purpose and scope of the study.  Chapter 2 includes a literature 
review of existing works, including subject matter relating to transportation 
infrastructure vulnerability, terrorist attack scenarios, blast resistant bridge design, 
and performance-based design concepts.  Chapter 3 is a general explanation of the 
proposed method.  Chapter 4 describes the proposed method in more detail and 
demonstrates its application in the case studies.  Chapters 5 - 7 carry out the case 
studies for three functional bridge types:  prestressed concrete beam, continuous steel 
plate girder, and deck cantilever truss.  Chapter 8 summarizes the case study results 
and recommends area of future research. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Before describing this study’s proposed method and demonstrating its 
application with three case studies, this chapter will review the existing literature with 
relevant subject matter.  Section 2.2 summarizes the current body of knowledge 
related to transportation infrastructure vulnerability.  These works use both qualitative 
and quantitative risk analysis methods to assess and manage risks to transportation 
facilities, such as bridges and tunnels.  Special attention is paid to works that include 
consequence assessment.  Section 2.3 describes possible terrorist threats, the most 
common involving conventional explosives.  Section 2.4 presents recent studies in 
blast resistant bridge design, in order to get an idea of the structural response and 
reliability of bridges during blast events.  In Section 2.5, performance-based design 
(PBD) is discussed.  The current state-of-practice and “next generation” performance-
based seismic design guidelines are summarized.  Next, works that propose extending 
seismic PBD principles and practices to include other extreme events, such as blasts, 
are explained.  The section closes with the potential application of performance-based 
methods to bridge design. 
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2.2  Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Analyses 
2.2.1  Qualitative Risk Analysis Methods 
In September 2003, the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) for Bridge and Tunnel 
Security issued Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security [2].  This report 
was developed at the request of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and 
the AASHTO Transportation Security Task Force.  The BRP was made up of bridge 
and tunnel experts from academia, private practice and government agencies, who 
applied their collective knowledge “to examine bridge and tunnel security and to 
develop strategies and practices for deterring, disrupting, and mitigating potential 
attacks” [2].  The panel reports that of the 600,000 bridges and 500 tunnels in the 
United States, approximately 1,000 are deemed critical, meaning substantial 
casualties, economic and social consequences could occur if attacked.  Terrorism 
imposes real threats that must be addressed in homeland security policy, and this 
should account for critical bridges and tunnels. 
The report makes several “overarching recommendations” that will reduce 
bridge and tunnel vulnerability.  Institutional recommendations include interagency 
coordination, outreach and communication strategies, and clarification of legal 
responsibility.  The panel also makes fiscal recommendations, which includes finding 
new funding sources for bridge and tunnel security, as well as addressing funding 
eligibility.  Technical recommendations include engineering new security solutions, 
and research, development, and implementation. 
The BRP recognizes that a standardized and objective method for identifying 
the most vulnerable bridges and tunnels is needed.  The panel recommends a two-step 
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process:  prioritization and risk assessment.  Prioritization, which could be based on 
subjective or empirical criteria, can identify the most likely targets.  Risk assessment 
is applied to the high priority bridges and tunnels using this approach: 
 
  R = O * V * I                  (2.1) 
 
Where   R = facility risk 
 
  O = Occurrence likelihood of an attack 
 
  V = Vulnerability of likely damage to the structure 
 
I = Importance of the facility with respect to the consequences of an 
attack 
 
The factors can be calculated based on attributes shown in Figure 2-1.  After 
collecting the necessary information, the decision makers come to a consensus on the 
facility’s risk. 
 
   Figure 2-1:  Components in Risk Assessment for an Individual Facility [2] 
 
 
The Vulnerability Factor (V) is a consequence measure for the facility.  The 
BRP recommends that the consequences analyzed should include expected damage to 
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the structure, expected closure or down-time to the facility, and expected number of 
casualties.   
A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification 
and Protection (Guide) [1] was prepared in May 2002 under the direction of the 
National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for AASHTO’s 
Transportation Security Task Force.  The Guide was developed for state departments 
of transportation to conduct vulnerability assessments of their transportation assets, 
develop countermeasures to possible terrorist threats, estimate the cost of these 
countermeasures, and improve security operational planning.  The Guide 
recommends a six-step process for vulnerability analysis that can be applied to all 
forms of highway infrastructure: 
 
Step 1:  Critical Assets Identification 
 
Step 2:  Assess Vulnerabilities 
 
Step 3:  Assess Consequences 
 
Step 4:  Identify Countermeasures 
 
Step 5:  Estimate Countermeasures Cost 
 
Step 6:  Review Operational Security Planning 
 
These steps are an iterative process, so each State DOT can adopt and adjust 
the procedure to its unique transportation assets.  Step 3, the consequence assessment 
is of direct relevance to this thesis.  The Guide recommends a two-step consequence 
assessment process.  In the first step, “criticality (X) and vulnerability (Y) coordinates 
are calculated for each asset,” using the results from Step 1 and Step 2 of the Guide’s 
methodology [1].  These coordinates can be plotted in a “Criticality and Vulnerability 
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Matrix,” as shown in Figure 2-2.  This matrix prioritizes the assets with the highest 
consequence in Quadrant I.   
 
 
   Figure 2-2:  Criticality and Vulnerability Matrix [1] 
 
The second step of consequence analysis is to consider the consequences of 
the critical assets in Quadrant I.  The specific consequences are unique to the asset 
and the attack scenario.  The Guide goes on to state that consequences can “vary from 
loss of life and property associated with the attack to loss of an important part of the 
transportation infrastructure needed to support economic activity, military 
deployment,” or the loss of an evacuation route [1]. 
In 2007, Adel Al-Weezer completed his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of 
Maryland entitled Risk-Based Methodology for Bridge Maintenance Strategies [4].  
The study proposes a risk-based approach to aid in bridge maintenance decision 
making.  Highway and bridge agencies are typically only concerned with costs, so 
adding a risk analysis procedure can increase the efficiency of traditional bridge 
maintenance strategies.  The approach first assesses risks to a bridge, based on failure 
probabilities and failure consequences of the bridge elements.  It also proposes 
strategies for managing these risks.  Optimal maintenance actions can then be chosen 
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based on both benefit-cost analysis and the risks associated with the bridge elements. 
The study focuses on risks at the bridge element level, while also proposing bridge-
level priority ranking.  This allows state agencies to prioritize between bridges in their 
inventories and then between maintenance needs on an individual bridge. 
Of direct relevance to this thesis, the author provides information on failure 
consequences of bridge elements.  He summarizes the possible consequences to a 
bridge as the following: 
1. Agency consequences related to the element, 
2. Agency consequences related to the bridge, 
3. Consequences related to the bridge users due to time delay, traffic   
   diversion and/or bridge closure, 
4. Consequences related to traffic accident, 
5. Consequences related to health and safety in terms of injuries and/or 
deaths, 
6. Consequences related to the environment, 
7. Consequences to nearby businesses, and 
8. Consequences to the general public  [4]. 
 
The total consequence is the summation of all possible consequences to a 
bridge element.  In addition, the author notes that uncertainty must be accounted for 
in consequence evaluation.  Therefore, probability distributions can be used for each 
consequence type.  The dissertation’s appendix provides more details about possible 
bridge failure consequences and how to qualitatively estimate their severities. 
2.2.2  Quantitative Risk Analysis Methods 
Bensi, a University of Delaware student, completed her Master’s thesis on 
vulnerability assessment of bridges to terrorist attacks [7].  Using a probabilistic, 
structural analysis based approach, the objective of the study is to guide bridge 
owners in deciding how to distribute their resources to protect the facilities in their 
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inventories from terrorist attack.  A thorough literature review shows that 
“prescriptive” methodologies for vulnerability assessment are most common, and so 
the proposed methodology is less subjective and more technical.   
The proposed method starts by simulating the “initiating events” (attack 
scenarios) using Monte Carlo simulation.  Each initiating event is applied to the 
structure, and the structural response is analyzed.  Next, the consequences for each 
simulated scenario must be determined and quantified as costs.  Using the results, a 
distribution of the structural response is calculated, as well as a distribution of costs.  
Using the distribution of the structural response, a Vulnerability Index (Iv) is 
calculated.  This index indicates the potential damage to the bridge, given that an 
attack occurs.  The total costs of damage to the bridge can be used to calculate a 
Criticality Index (Ic).  This index is based on the “costs associated with other bridges 
in the inventory relative to the individual bridge being assessed” [7].  This value aids 
the bridge owner in deciding how critical the loss of the bridge is in comparison with 
the other bridges in the inventory.  Using both indices, a bridge owner can compare 
and contrast the structural reliability and expected loss of each bridge, which can aid 
decisions regarding risk mitigation strategies. 
“Risk Analysis for Critical Asset Protection” by McGill et al. [21] proposes a 
quantitative risk assessment and management methodology in order to aid in security 
decision making for critical infrastructure resource allocations.  This study applies an 
asset-driven approach, using a critical asset’s unique characteristics to develop all 
possible human-caused threat scenarios.  The framework includes five phases:  
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Scenario Identification, Consequence and Criticality Assessment, Security 
Vulnerability Assessment, Threat Likelihood Assessment, and Benefit-Cost Analysis.   
In the first phase, Scenario Identification, an “exhaustive set of plausible 
threat scenarios” is developed for a critical asset [21].  These threats can be mapped 
in a target susceptibility matrix in order to understand which threat types can affect 
each of the asset’s key elements.   
Consequence and Criticality Assessment estimates the total amount of loss 
given that the threat scenario is successful.  Five suggested dimensions of 
consequences are fatalities and injuries, asset repair costs, asset loss costs, 
recuperation time, and environmental damage.  The loss for each threat scenario can 
be calculated as a function of the maximum possible loss, the physical vulnerability 
of the asset, and response and recovery effectiveness.  
Security Vulnerability Assessment involves creating possible attack profiles, 
which are a combination of the threat delivery system and the intrusion path.  Each 
threat delivery system has a range of possible threat intensities, which can be 
represented by a probability distribution or expert elicitation.  The probability of the 
security system being successful is the product of the probability of threat detection 
and response engagement and the probability that the threat is neutralized, given that 
it is detected and engaged.  The probability of threat success is the product of the 
probability of security system failure and the probability that the threat will be 
successful given that the security system fails.  The conditional risk (in loss amount 
per threat event) can then be calculated as the probability of threat success multiplied 
by the expected loss (in Phase 3) given threat success. 
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The Threat Likelihood Analysis determines the annual rate of occurrence of 
each threat and takes into account that the threat might change when the adversary 
responds to security measures that are put in place.  This idea is based on the 
adversary’s expected utility of each attack profile.  A target that is attractive to the 
adversary is more likely to be attacked than if the target is not as attractive as a result 
of security countermeasures or mitigation strategies. 
The final phase of the methodology is a risk management strategy to evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness or proposed countermeasures and/or mitigation strategies.  The 
goal is to maximize the benefit-cost ratio.   
In “Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis (CAPRA) for Homeland 
Security:  An All-Hazards Framework” [11] the authors expand the previous paper 
[21] to include both natural and man-made threats.  The risk assessment and 
management approach follows the same procedure as in [21].  The method allows the 
implementer to take an asset-driven or portfolio-driven approach, depending on the 
assets in question.  A region or owner’s critical infrastructure can be grouped into a 
portfolio, and there can be interdependencies between assets.  The study proposed a 
portfolio interdependency analysis to quantify consequences that account for this 
possibility. 
The procedure calculates risk by using the model traditionally used in security 
studies, by finding the Cartesian product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  
As in the previous study, the parameters used in the model can be high-level, or a 
result of a detailed systems analysis. 
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2.3  Characterizing Terrorist Attack Scenarios 
The National Needs Assessment for Ensuring Transportation Infrastructure 
Security (NNA) [3] was requested by AASHTO’s Transportation Security Task Force 
and completed in October 2002.  The study focuses on three planning program areas:  
protecting critical mobility assets, enhancing traffic management capabilities, and 
improving state emergency response capabilities.  Protecting critical mobility assets is 
of relevance to this thesis, so only this planning program area will be discussed 
further.  The NNA states that the “principal threat against highway physical assets is 
explosive attacks on key links such as bridges, interchanges, and tunnels” [3].  The 
report characterizes terrorist attacks as having “high concept/low tech” approaches.  
Explosive attacks are the most common, and the most likely explosive attack 
scenarios and their impacts are shown in Table 2-1, taken from the Federal Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Agency web site. 
  Table 2-1:  Vehicle Bomb Explosion Effects [3] 
 
   
The report goes on to estimate that approximately 450 bridges and 50 tunnels 
meet criteria to be deemed “critical” facilities.  These critical assets can be protected 
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by deterring terrorist attacks, which can be done in two ways:   by adding new 
security features to reduce the vulnerability and by minimizing the potential damage, 
given that an attack occurs. 
2.4  Blast Resistant Bridge Design 
Islam, a Ph.D. student at Florida State University completed his dissertation 
on the Performance of AASHTO Girders Bridges under Blast Loading [18].  The 
purpose of the study is to assess the performance of a concrete girder bridge to typical 
blast loads, in the hope that blast-resistant design guidelines for such bridges will be 
developed in the future.  The study begins by reviewing bridges in Florida’s highway 
system in order to choose a bridge type to model.  Then, the author reviews some 
well-known explosive attacks and bridge failures of the past.    
For the bridge model, the author designs a typical two-span, two-lane concrete 
Type III girder bridge using AASHTO Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) 
methods.  The bridge model is characteristic of concrete bridges in Florida, where 
some 90% of highway bridges use AASHTO girders.  The author uses AT-Blast, a 
software program that estimates blast loadings in open-air explosion, to convert a 
500-pound TNT explosion into equivalent static loads that could be easily applied to 
the bridge model.  Using STAAD.Pro software, the bridge is modeled with five blast 
loading cases:  under the bridge at mid-span, over the bridge at mid-span, over the 
bridge at the pier cap, over the bridge at end span, and under the bridge at four feet 
away from the column.  The program output gave moments and shear forces for 
critical bridge elements, which are compared to the respective elements capacity to 
determine failure.  In all five loading cases, the girder bridge fails, leaving the author 
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to conclude that Type III AASHTO girder bridges cannot withstand a 500-pound 
TNT explosion.  The study then uses a trial and error approach to find the amount of 
blast loads and the minimum standoff distance that the girders and columns/pier cap 
could resist. 
In August 2005, an article entitled “Analysis and Design of Critical Bridges 
Subjected to Blast Loads” appeared in ASCE’s Journal of Structural Engineering 
[28]. Blast-resistant design standards are usually reserved for important buildings, 
such as essential government, military and petrochemical structures.  Security has not 
been a consideration for bridge designers, but recent terrorist threats and activity has 
brought attention to the vulnerability of transportation infrastructure, especially 
bridges.  This study summarizes the results of current research to develop 
performance-based blast design standards for bridges.  Physical security techniques 
and site layout principles must be integrated into the bridge design process. 
This paper makes some observations about a bridge’s structural response to a 
blast load.  One point that is relevant to this thesis is that military operations have 
suggested that a bridge’s substructure can generally withstand “modest above deck 
explosive loads” [28].  In the analysis, bomb sizes are considered ranging from 100 
lbs to 4,000 lbs of TNT equivalent explosives.   A large hand-placed explosion is 
about 100 lbs of TNT, while a typical car bomb can hold 220 lbs of TNT.  A light, 
single rear-axle delivery vehicle can hold 4,000 lbs of explosives.  The authors note 
that “individual charges greater than 4,000 lbs are very difficult to achieve when 
using improvised explosives” [28].  The explosion is difficult to initiate so that the 
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entire amount reacts at once, which means that higher charge weights may not have 
an impact much greater than 4,000 pounds of explosives. 
Suthar, another student of Dr. Chung Fu at the University of Maryland, 
completed his Master’s thesis entitled The Effect of Dead, Live and Blast Loads on a 
Suspension Bridge [24].  After creating a 3D finite element analysis model of the 
westbound Chesapeake Bay Bridge’s suspension span, nonlinear analysis with dead, 
live and blast loads is carried out.  For the live load, the author uses the design truck 
(HS-20) dynamic loading.  The results obtained closely align with data from the State 
Roads Commission, which shows the validity of the software used, Visual Bridge 
Design System (VBDS).  For the blast load, the suspension bridge was modeled in 
SAP2000, and the static-equivalent of a charge weight of 500 pounds TNT is applied.  
The author uses the progressive collapse approach, which includes the formation of 
plastic hinges.  The software’s output displayed moments, axial loads, and 
deformations of the structural members, and the study concludes that the suspension 
bridge experiences local failure in response to the blast load.  The author hopes that 
his work can provide a guideline for blast load analysis on a suspension bridge, since 
there are currently no standardized criteria.   
2.5  Performance-Based Design 
Traditional structural design codes use prescriptive methodologies.  These 
codes focus on designing individual structural members to a certain strength or 
capacity, without addressing the overall performance of the structure in response to 
the applied loading.  Performance-based design (PBD) is a process that allows the 
design of new structures (or upgrade of existing structures) to meet performance 
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objectives that are acceptable to the designer, owner, and/or other stakeholders.  It is a 
systematic process that has four basic steps: 
1. Select performance objective. 
2. Design the structure. 
3. Assess performance of structure using acceptance criteria.  
4. Revise design if performance objectives not met. 
This process can be repeated until the desired performance level is achieved. 
At this point in time, the performance-based approach is most widely applied in 
building design for earthquakes.  However, these performance-based building codes 
can be applied to other structures, such as highway bridges, and extended to account 
for events other than earthquakes, such as hurricanes, fires, or in the case of this 
thesis, terrorist attacks.   
2.5.1  Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) 
The 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes caused substantial 
economic losses and structural damage in California.  These events stimulated the 
development of performance-based design procedures in order to minimize the losses 
triggered by earthquakes.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
funded the Applied Technology Council (ATC) and Building Seismic Safety Council 
(BSSC) to produce the NEHRP Guidelines and Commentary for the Seismic 
Rehabilitation of Buildings, also known as FEMA 273 [13].  An important feature of 
FEMA 273 is that it introduced “standard performance levels, which quantified levels 
of structural and nonstructural damage, based on values of standard structural 
response parameters” [26].  These performance levels describe the degree to which 
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the building or structure is able to withstand the chosen design earthquake.  The three 
performance levels are Immediate Occupancy (IO), Life Safety (LS), and Collapse 
Prevention (CP), which are described in Table 2-2 and in the following paragraphs.   
 Table 2-2:  Building Performance Levels per FEMA 273 [26] 
 
 
The Immediate Occupancy performance level means that the building or 
structure can be occupied immediately following the earthquake.  There is negligible 
structural damage, no threat to occupants’ safety, and the building can function 
normally while any minor damage is being repaired. 
 At the Life Safety performance level, significant damage to the structure has 
occurred, “but some margin against either partial or total structure collapse remains” 
[13].  It is possible that some structural elements are severely damaged, but there is 
no falling debris hazard.  The overall risk to life as a result of structural damage is 
low.  However, the structure is not safe for re-occupancy until repairs are made.  The 
repairs necessary are possible, but for economic reasons may not be practical. 
 At the Collapse Prevention performance level, the building is on the verge of 
partial or total collapse.  There is severe structural damage, and the structure has 
experienced a significant decrease in stiffness and strength.  Large permanent lateral 
deformations are probable.  There are significant risks of injury or death as a result of 
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falling structural debris.  The structure is unsafe for occupancy, and total replacement 
is probably more practical than repairing the damage. 
 In 2000, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) converted the 
FEMA 273 and 274 reports into FEMA 356, the Prestandard and Commentary for 
Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings [14].  FEMA 356 represents the current state-of-
practice for performance-based earthquake engineering.   
2.5.2  Recent Developments in PBEE 
In 2001, FEMA awarded a contract to the Applied Technology Council to 
produce the “next-generation” performance-based seismic design guidelines for new 
and existing buildings, called the ATC-58 project [6].  “First generation” procedures, 
such as FEMA 273/274 [13], do not include direct quantitative information on 
possible consequences at the different performance levels.  ATC-58 addresses this 
concern and will express structural performance directly in terms of three quantified 
risks:  direct losses (cost of structural damage and repair/replacement), downtime 
associated with structural damage, and casualties.  These measures are most 
important to stakeholders, as was decided in a workshop.  In addition to seismic 
effects, ATC-58 seeks to incorporate effects from blast, fire, and wind to 
performance-based design. 
 The ATC-58 project will use the procedures developed by the Pacific 
Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center, headquartered at the University of 
California, Berkeley.  Over the past 10 years, PEER has developed a performance-
based earthquake engineering (PBEE) approach, “aimed at improving decision-
making about seismic risk by making the choice of performance goals and the 
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tradeoffs that they entail apparent to facility owners and society at large” [22].  The 
procedure is a probabilistic, performance-based method that accounts for the many 
sources of uncertainty in seismic design.  It is the first approach to date that 
incorporates loss modeling and takes an economic standpoint in evaluating structural 
performance during and after an earthquake event. 
 PEER’s performance-based method has four sequential steps.  The result of 
each step is a generalized variable:  intensity measure (IM), engineering demand 
parameter (EDP), damage measure (DM), and decision variable (DV), as shown in 
Figure 2-3.   
 
         Figure 2-3:  PEER Framework [19] 
 
In the first step, Hazard Analysis, the ground motion intensity for the design 
earthquake is decided on, which yields the IM.  During Step 2, a structural analysis is 
performed on the structure, and the seismic demand is characterized by structural 
response measures, or EDPs.  Examples of EDPs could be stresses, forces, or plastic 
deformation.  The outcome of this step is a conditional probability distribution; that 
is, the probability of the structural response measure given that the IM occurs.  
During the third step, Damage Analysis, response measure in Step 2 is converted to a 
quantifiable damage state.  In the PEER framework, damage states are expressed as 
fragility functions, which are cumulative distribution functions of the damage 
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measure (DM).  The fourth and final step of the PEER methodology calculates the 
loss-modeling measure, or decision variable.  Possible DVs include economic losses, 
such as replacement costs or duration of facility closure.  Each step is based on a 
conditional probability with the previous step’s generalized variable.  
It should be noted that PEER’s PBEE framework depends on three 
mathematical models [20].  First, a probabilistic seismic demand model is needed to 
relate earthquake intensities to structural response parameters (IMs to EDPs).  A 
probabilistic damage model is needed to relate the engineering demand parameters to 
the damage states for structural components (EDPs to DMs).  Finally, a cost model is 
necessary to relate the damage state of a structural component to the estimated costs 
or material quantities that repair or replacement would require (DMs to DVs).     
In 2007, Sashi Kunnath applied and evaluated the PEER performance-based 
method to a viaduct in California [19].  The study is part of several “testbed” studies 
with the purpose of testing the PEER framework on existing facilities.  To account for 
uncertainty in structural modeling, a lognormal probability distribution is used for the 
structural response measures, or EDPs.  The EDP chosen is the maximum column 
drift ratio, which must be related to the chosen damage measure (DM), the onset of 
cover concrete spalling and longitudinal bar buckling.  The PEER Structure 
Performance Database provides the information necessary to quantitatively link these 
two parameters, and the fragility functions for the damage measures could be derived.  
Next, conducting the loss analysis presents a challenge, since “limited research has 
been conducted on the relationship between bridge damage and bridge performance” 
[19].  The study attempts to use the traditional performance levels outlined in FEMA 
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273/274 (Immediate Occupancy, Life Safety, and Collapse Prevention) to create the 
decision variable, which is the probability of bridge closure. 
In “Method for Post-Earthquake Highway Bridge Repair Cost Estimation” 
[20], three researchers from the University of California, Berkeley demonstrate the 
PEER PBEE framework by estimating highway bridge repair costs.  The study 
quantifies the expected repair cost and variance of a representative reinforced 
concrete highway overpass bridge after applying an earthquake event.  Repair cost 
data for the different bridge elements were taken from the California Department of 
Transportation’s Construction Statistics Bridge Design Aids [9] and used to formulate 
repair costs models as a function of earthquake intensity.    The approach uses a 
graphical tool called Fourway, and it is based on first and second central probabilistic 
moments.  The study finds that the expected repair cost of the bridge after an 
earthquake is significantly lower than the expected bridge replacement cost. 
2.5.3  Performance-Based Blast Engineering (PBBE) 
Although performance-based design has been mostly applied to earthquake 
engineering, the concepts can be extended to other extreme loadings, such as blasts.  
In “Performance-Based Engineering of Buildings and Infrastructure for Extreme 
Loadings” [27], Whittaker recommends applying the wealth of knowledge developed 
for PBEE to blast loadings on structures.  Prior to the 1990’s, blast resistance was a 
concern of only a small group of professionals:  consulting specialists who worked to 
protect “high exposure” facilities, such as government buildings, military and energy 
facilities.  However, recent terrorist attacks have increased awareness of the 
importance of blast resistant design.  Unlike in seismic design, “there has been no 
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national effort” to publish guidelines for the design and analysis of blast-resistant 
structures [27].   
 The author compares and contrasts seismic and blast loadings in order to 
identify how PEER’s PBEE framework would have to be adjusted to extend to blasts.  
Overall, it can be said that inelastic structural response can be expected in any 
extreme loading case.  However, characterizing a blast load is deterministic and uses 
a scenario event composed of a charge weight and location, while seismic events are 
characterized probabilistically using a hazard curve.  The blast intensity measure (IM) 
would have to be converted into a loading function, such as a pressure-impulse curve.  
Also, the response of the individual structural components would differ (EDPs).   
The author recommends using the performance levels established in FEMA 
273/274 [13] and FEMA 356 [14] for blast analysis, as shown in Table 2-3.  It should 
be noted that the damage descriptions and downtime estimates are changeable and 
only proposed to “foster discussion” [27].   
Table 2-3:  Possible Performance Levels for Blast-Type Loadings [27] 
 
 
 In “Risk Perception in Performance-Based Building Design and Applications 
to Terrorism-Resistant Design” [25], the authors note that the public’s perception of 
risk has increased dramatically in recent years as a result of terrorist attacks, natural 
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disasters, and fires.  As technology and structural design methods advance, buildings 
and structures are becoming taller, larger, and more complex, which can cause their 
occupants to feel anxiety about their safety.  The article discusses the current 
applications of performance-based design in earthquake engineering and suggests 
applying PBD to terrorist-resistant design, such as blasts.  Since terrorist attacks are 
difficult to characterize and predict (e.g. they can occur anywhere at any time), 
traditional prescriptive codes are insufficient.  Performance-based methods can adapt 
and change based on the hazard identified. 
2.5.4  Performance-Based Approach to Bridges 
In “Performance-Based Design Approach in Seismic Analysis of Bridges” 
[16], the authors discuss the relevance of performance-based design criteria to 
highway bridges.  The article begins by summarizing and evaluating the current body 
of knowledge relating to performance-based seismic analysis.  The authors then 
discuss how the existing guidelines are relevant to highway bridges and include 
example bridge applications.  Next, the article discusses the findings of “The 
Working Group on Bridge Design Issues” [23].  Since bridges contain less 
nonstructural elements than buildings, the inclusion of nonstructural elements in 
performance-based seismic analysis of bridges is not necessary.  Three performance 
levels are proposed:  operational without traffic interruption, operational with minor 
damage, and near collapse.  ATC-18 recommends two service levels for bridges in 
seismic events:  immediate and limited.  ATC-32 proposes three damage levels:  
minimal, repairable, and significant.  The authors combine the performance, service, 
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and damage criteria to propose three bridge performance levels:  immediate service, 
limited service, and collapse prevention.   
The article closes by discussing the barriers to widespread implementation of 
the performance-based method to bridge design.  First of all, the initial investment for 
the bridge will be higher, in order to meet the desired performance levels.  Designers 
and bridge owners must be able to work together and absorb these higher costs, 
keeping in mind that the bridge will perform better in an earthquake event.  In 
addition, the design process becomes “more complex and time consuming” when 
performance-based methods are applied [16].   
2.6 Closing Remarks 
This chapter has presented an overview of existing literature that is relevant to 
this thesis.  An important concept to take away from this chapter is that risk analysis 
is a useful tool for assessing the vulnerability of bridges to terrorist threats.  
Consequence assessment, one aspect of risk analysis, can be qualitative or 
quantitative.  Qualitative studies are simpler and more straightforward to conduct; 
however, they sometimes can be too subjective.  The analyzer’s own judgments and 
bias can skew the results.  Quantitative analyses with a mathematical basis can yield 
more accurate results.  However, quantitative studies require far more input data than 
their qualitative counterparts, which can increase computational time and effort.  In 
addition, sometimes there is not enough input data to complete an acceptable 
quantitative study.   
This chapter also describes performance-based design guidelines and their 
establishment in the seismic community.  It is clear that performance-based concepts 
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can be adapted for blast events on bridges.  The performance level criteria will be 
used in this thesis to characterize the structural response of bridges to an explosive 
attack.  It is the hope of the author that future research will build on current 
performance-based practices and stimulate the development of official guidelines 
(similar to FEMA 356 and ATC-58) for blast loads. 
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3.0  PROPOSED METHOD 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This study proposes a method to evaluate the structural response and 
consequences of a terrorist attack on a highway bridge.  The procedure is based on 
structural analysis and uses probability distributions to account for uncertainty.  
Performance level criteria, well established in the seismic community, can be adapted 
to blast loads and used to measure the bridge structural response.  The consequences 
of an attack, in monetary terms, are estimated based on the response’s performance 
levels.  By analyzing the different bridge functional types separately, the bridge 
owner or operating agency can compare the expected consequences, to help make 
decisions regarding risk mitigation or countermeasures.   
3.2  Proposed Method 
This study seeks to estimate the expected consequence costs of a terrorist 
attack, using three functional bridge types of an existing long-span bridge as case 
studies.  The proposed method is illustrated in a flowchart in Figure 3-1.  The 
procedure can be adapted and modified as needed to fit the user’s purpose and scope.  
Following Figure 3-1 is a general description of each step.  Details of the method 
unique to this study will be explained in Chapters 4-7, where three case studies 
demonstrate the procedure. 
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4.  Analyze Structural 
Response of Bridge with 
respect to Performance 
Levels 
5.  Assess Consequences:  
Structural Damage (CS) 
Casualties (CC) 
Downtime (CD) 
2.  Create Structural 
Analysis Model of Bridge 
3.  Apply Attack Scenario(s) 
to Bridge Model 
1.  Define and Generate 
Attack Scenario using 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
         Figure 3-1:  Proposed Method  
 
 The first step of the method is defining the attack scenario.  This includes the 
location of the attack, delivery method, and magnitude.  The National Needs 
Assessment [3] characterizes possible weapons used by terrorists to include:  
conventional explosives, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.  Another 
type of attack is described as “novel concept,” such as an unusual delivery system 
 29 
 
 
(i.e. aircraft or boat) [3].  This study will limit the attack scenarios to vehicle-bound 
conventional explosives, measured in TNT charge weight.  After deciding which 
attack type will be analyzed, the location and magnitude of the scenario must be 
defined.  These parameters can be characterized by appropriate probability 
distributions to account for uncertainty.  Monte Carlo simulation is used to randomly 
generate the attack scenarios.  The user determines how many simulations are 
necessary for the analysis, based on the purposes of the study.   
 The second step of the procedure is creating a structural analysis model of the 
bridge(s) in question.  If the study includes an inventory of facilities, representative 
spans of each functional type should be chosen to model.  This method can also be 
used to study a long-span bridge with different functional bridge types.  Again, 
representative spans of each functional type can be modeled.  The use of commercial 
structural analysis software is suggested (e.g. ANSYS, SAP2000, STAADPro).  The 
complexity of the structural model can vary in conjunction with the level of detail 
necessary in the analysis.  
 Next, the randomly generated attack scenarios are applied to the modeled 
bridge(s) and structural analysis is performed.  Analyzing the structural response 
involves designating a damage measure.  This study proposes that the performance 
levels established in performance-based seismic design guidelines (Immediate 
Occupancy, Life Safety, and Collapse Prevention) are used to describe the level of 
damage the structure experiences.   
 The final step of the procedure involves estimating the consequences of the 
attacks.  Possible consequences include cost of structural repair or replacement, 
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casualties and injuries, costs associated with downtime of the structure, 
environmental costs, costs to society, and so on.  It is important to acquire reliable 
data and cost information before completing a consequence analysis.  Often, 
consequences are estimated based on historical data, expert opinion, or quantitative 
models.  This study proposes estimating the consequences suggested by ATC-58 [6], 
discussed in the literature review:  cost of structural damage (repair or replacement), 
downtime associated with structural damage, and loss of life.  The BRP report [2] 
also recommends analyzing these three consequences.  The consequences are 
estimated for each attack scenario and then averaged for each bridge type in order to 
find the expected value of consequence costs.    
Chapter 4 demonstrates the proposed method in more detail.  Case studies for 
three bridge functional types follow in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.   
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4.0  METHOD DEMONSTRATION 
 
The proposed method will be demonstrated for three functional bridge types 
of an existing long-span bridge.  For security reasons, the bridge’s name and location 
cannot be identified.  The case studies will analyze representative spans of three 
bridge types:  60’ prestressed concrete (PC) beam bridge, 606’ continuous steel plate 
girder (SG) bridge, and 1350’ deck cantilever truss (DT) bridge.   
This chapter describes the proposed method as applied to the three case 
studies.  Chapters 5 -7 will describe each bridge as well as items unique to the 
modeling of that particular bridge type.  Chapters 5-7 will also summarize the applied 
attack scenarios, structural responses, and consequences for each bridge type. 
4.1  Define Attack Scenarios 
4.1.1  Introduction 
The Federal Highway Administration estimates that 60% of terrorist attacks 
use conventional explosives.  In this study, the attack scenarios are limited to TNT-
equivalent blasts that occur over the bridge deck (e.g. carried in a vehicle traveling on 
the bridge).  Winget et al. states that a height of four feet is “considered the standard 
center of mass for most vehicle explosions” [28].  This value is used in the case 
studies. 
This study’s analysis is completed with the assumption that an attack has 
occurred on the bridge.  A probabilistic method is used to generate random attack 
scenarios using Monte Carlo simulation.  The attack scenarios are based on 
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probability distributions for the explosion’s centroid location on the bridge deck, as 
well as the charge weight of the blast.  Five attack scenarios are randomly generated 
in this study.  Although some might say this violates small sample properties, the case 
studies are included for the purpose of demonstrating how to apply the proposed 
method.  Therefore, more attack scenarios are not needed. 
4.1.2  Attack Location 
The location of an explosive attack can be represented by a uniform 
probability distribution along the bridge’s length; that is, there is an equal probability 
of the attack occurring at any one point on the bridge.  The bridge in question has 
three lanes of traffic, so it is assumed that the explosives are carried in a vehicle 
traveling along the centerline of the middle lane of traffic, as shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
 
         Figure 4-1:  Attack Location in Center Lane  
Lane 2 
Lane 3 
Lane 1 
L 
 
Since the three bridge types vary in length, the randomly generated value is a 
relative location along the bridge length, characterized by a uniform distribution from 
0 to 1.  The uniform distribution is illustrated in Figure 4-2.  This relative location is 
multiplied by the bridge type’s length to calculate the location.  Table 4-1 shows the 
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randomly generated relative location value for the five simulations.  Table 4-2 
displays the associated blast location for each bridge type. 
Uniform Distribution
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        Figure 4-2:  Relative Location of Blast Centroid 
 
 
   Table 4-1:  Randomly Generated Attack Locations 
Attack 
Scenario
Relative Blast Location 
Along Bridge Length
1 0.57
2 0.73
3 0.21
4 0.60
5 0.34  
 
 
Table 4-2:  Attack Location along Bridge Length for Bridge Types 
Pre-Stressed Concrete 
Beam Bridge
Continuous Plate 
Girder Bridge
Cantilever Deck Truss 
Bridge
1 34 347 773
2 44 444 990
3 13 130 290
4 36 361 803
5 21 209 465
Blast Location Along Bridge Length (feet)
Attack 
Scenario
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4.1.3  Attack Magnitude 
Chapter 2’s literature review is helpful in defining the explosion magnitude.  
The BRP report notes that the “highest probability” threat of a conventional explosive 
attack is a car bomb carrying 500 pounds of TNT explosives [2].  Winget et al. 
recommends setting an upper limit charge weight of 4,000 pounds and a lower limit 
of 100 pounds [28].  A triangular probability distribution is assigned to the blast 
magnitude, as shown in Figure 4-3.  Triangular distributions are best suited when the 
lower and upper limits are known, as well as the most likely case.  
Triangular Distribution
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            Figure 4-3:  Blast Magnitude Probability Distribution 
 
Table 4-3 presents the randomly generated blast charge weights for the five 
simulations.  These charge weights apply to all three bridge types in the case studies. 
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           Table 4-3:  Randomly Generated Blast Magnitudes 
Attack 
Scenario
Charge Weight (lbs 
TNT)
1 674
2 1009
3 437
4 2911
5 1821  
4.2  Create Bridge Model 
4.2.1  Structural Analysis Software 
The three bridge models are using SAP2000 [10], a commercially available 
structural analysis and design software package.  SAP2000 was created over 30 years 
ago, by Computers and Structures, Inc. (CSI), in Berkeley, California.  The software’s 
3D object-based graphical modeling interface has countless analysis and design 
options:  from simple linear elastic analyses to complex nonlinear dynamic analyses.  
Add-on modules are available for modeling bridges, offshore/wave structures, or 
structures with staged construction. 
 For this thesis, SAP2000 Advanced Version 11 is used.  The “Bridge Wizard” 
module was found to be helpful for modeling the prestressed concrete beam and steel 
plate girder bridges.  For the deck truss bridge, the element geometry was entered into 
a formatted Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and then imported into SAP.  The specific 
details related to each bridge’s structural model is discussed at the beginning of 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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4.3  Apply Attack Scenarios to Bridge Model 
4.3.1  Blast Loads 
When explosives are detonated, substantial amounts of energy are released.  
The blast wave contains high pressure/high temperature gas that expands spherically 
outward from the blast origin, at speeds faster than the speed of sound.  As the wave 
expands, pressures decrease at a high rate, approximately the cube root of distance.  
The positive pressure wave is followed by a negative pressure wave, as shown in 
Figure 4-4.  However, the effects of the negative pressure wave can usually be 
ignored.  A typical blast wave only lasts a few milliseconds. 
 
   Figure 4-4:  Blast Pressure vs. Time 
 
 When the shock front of the blast wave comes in contact with a structure, it 
reflects back, causing an increase in pressure.  Reflected pressure is always greater 
than the incident pressure.  Surface faces that are perpendicular to the blast wave 
experience higher reflected pressures than surfaces that are parallel to the blast wave.  
 
 37 
 
 
4.3.2  Equivalent Static Loads 
This thesis uses nonlinear static analysis to analyze the bridge structures with 
blast loading.  Therefore, the blast pressures must be converted to equivalent static 
loads.  In 1990, the Department of Defense published the TM 5-1300 Manual, 
Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions.  The manual contains an 
empirical formula to find the scaled distance (Z) of a blast wave. 
Z = 1/3W
R        (4.1) 
 In Equation 4.1, R is the standoff distance of an object from the blast centroid, 
measured in feet, and W is the charge weight of TNT in pounds.  The TM 5-1300 
Manual contains a chart using this empirical formula. 
 With this formula, Applied Research Associates, Inc. created AT-Blast [5], a 
software program that estimates the equivalent blast loads that occur during an open-
air explosion.  The program allows the user to input explosion characteristics, such as 
minimum and maximum distance from the explosion centroid to a surface, explosive 
charge weight of TNT, and angle of incidence.  The program then calculates shock 
front velocity, time of arrival, pressure, impulse, and duration.  These values are 
displayed in a tabular and graphical format.  Figure 4-5 displays a screenshot from 
AT-Blast with the following inputs:  a minimum range of 5 feet, a maximum range of 
25 feet, a 500-pound TNT charge weight, and a 0º angle of incidence. 
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Figure 4-5:  AT-Blast Screenshot 
 
 AT-Blast’s pressure outputs are used to apply static equivalent loads to this 
study’s bridge models.  The equivalent static loads are applied to the automatically 
generated joints along the beams and girders.  In order to calculate the distance from 
the explosion to the bridge surface, the height of the blast centroid must be defined.  
Assuming the bomb is carried in a car trunk or on a truck bed, it is approximated that 
the explosion centroid occurs four feet1 above the bridge deck, which is designated as 
Z.  The distance in the plane of the bridge deck of the point of interest from the 
explosion centroid is designated as X.  Using the Pythagorean Theorem, the distance 
(D) from the explosion centroid to the point on the bridge deck surface is calculated.  
The angle alpha (α) is calculated, which then gives the angle of incidence (θi).  The 
angle of incidence is defined as the angle measured from a ray to the surface normal 
to the surface at the point of intersection.  This means that:  θi = 90° - α.    If the point 
                                                 
1 Four feet is the accepted distance of an explosion centroid carried by a vehicle above a bridge deck 
[28]. 
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of interest on the bridge deck is exactly perpendicular to the blast wave, then the 
angle of incidence is 0º.  If the point of interest is parallel to the blast wave, then the 
angle of incidence is 90º.  These relationships are shown below in Figure 4-6. 
Z 
α 
D 
X 
α
θi 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Bridge Deck  
Figure 4-6:  Explosion Incidence Orientation 
 
 For each joint coordinate that falls on the centerline of beams or girders, the 
distance from the explosion centroid (D) and the angle of incidence (θi) is calculated.  
Entering these parameters into AT-Blast yields the static equivalent pressure at that 
joint coordinate.  Using the tributary area method, the load in kips on each joint is 
resolved.    
 Since this study uses varying charge weights, the influence surface of the blast 
will differ for each attack scenarios.  The influence surface is the surface area 
expanding radially from the explosion centroid.  As the blast magnitude increases, the 
influence surface increases.  This idea must be balanced with the fact that after a 
certain distance, the blast wave has little effect.  In addition, since the blast loads in 
this study are manually applied on each joint, reasonable cutoff criteria is necessary.  
Trial and error aided in deciding that the blast loads will be cutoff at pressures less 
than 200 psi.   
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4.4  Analyze Structural Response 
4.4.1  Nonlinear Analysis 
After applying each attack scenario’s blast loads to the bridge models, the 
structural responses are analyzed.  Blast loads, as well as other extreme loads (e.g. 
earthquakes) cause nonlinear response in structures.  Linear elastic analysis cannot 
sufficiently exhibit the bridge’s behavior to a blast load.  Therefore, nonlinear static 
analysis is performed. 
 This study accounts for material nonlinearity by applying plastic2 hinges to 
SAP2000 frame elements.  Hinge properties characterize the rigid-plastic behavior of 
a given member.  The nonlinear hinges plastify after reaching their strength or 
deformation capacities.  When the hinge can no longer support the load, the load is 
dropped and redistributed to other members.  FEMA 356 provides default hinge 
properties for use in seismic design, and SAP2000 incorporates these nonlinear values 
in its own hinge definitions.  One study notes that “use of this implementation is very 
common among the structural engineering profession and researchers” [17].  Figure 
4-7 shows a force vs. deformation diagram of a plastic hinge, used for force degrees 
of freedom such as axial and shear.  The same relationship applies to moment degrees 
of freedom, such as bending and torsion.  In that case, the axes would read moment 
vs. rotation. 
                                                 
2  In this study, “plastic” hinges will be used synonymously with “nonlinear” hinges. 
 41 
 
 
 
          Figure 4-7:  Typical Plastic Hinge [17] 
 
 On the force-deformation (moment-rotation) curve, Point A is always at the 
origin.  Point B represents the yield strength of the material.  After Point B, the hinge 
will only experience plastic behavior.  Point C represents the ultimate strength, while 
Point D represents the residual strength.  At Point E, total failure occurs as a result of 
the plastic hinge being unable to support the load. 
This study use  deformation controlled “M3” hinges on the bridge frame 
elements3, which include the beam, stringer, and deck elements for the prestressed 
concrete beam and steel plate girder bridges.  The M3 hinge type is used for beam 
elements that experience flexure.  For the deck truss bridge, M3 hinges are applied to 
the deck elements, stringers and floorbeams, while axial force “P” hinges are applied 
to the truss elements and bracing.  Hinges are applied at both ends of an element. 
4.4.2  Performance Levels 
In the default nonlinear hinge properties, SAP2000 incorporates the three 
performance levels outlined in performance-based seismic design guidelines, FEMA 
                                                 
3  SAP2000 calls beam members “frame” elements. 
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273 [13] and FEMA 356 [14].  Discussed in the literature review, the performance 
criteria represent the level of performance that a structure exhibits in response to a 
loading event.  This thesis proposes that these performance levels be adapted for 
blasts and utilized to express the structural response of bridges to blast loadings.  
These performance levels can be helpful in estimating the direct consequences of the 
blast attack, such as the cost of repairing or replacing the structural damage.  The 
definitions of the three performance levels will remain consistent with the FEMA 
studies; however, wording will be changed to apply to bridges experiencing a blast 
event.   
The first performance level, Immediate Occupancy (IO), is characterized by 
minor damage.  The structure is safe for vehicles immediately following the blast 
event.  The bridge is stable and repairs can be completed while the bridge is in 
service. 
At the second performance level, Life Safety (LS), there is significant damage 
to the bridge; however, the bridge is not near collapse.  Inspections and repairs will be 
necessary before the bridge can carry traffic again. 
The third performance level, Collapse Prevention (CP), represents a structure 
that is on the verge of collapse.  The bridge’s strength and deformation capacity is 
reached.  Structural damage is extensive, and repairs are most likely not economically 
feasible.  Instead, replacement of the bridge is necessary.  Since the structure is 
unstable, there is risk to life at this performance level. 
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SAP2000 uses the FEMA guidelines to locate the performance levels on the 
nonlinear hinge force-deformation or moment-rotation graphs.  Figure 4-8 shows 
SAP2000’s deformation-controlled, M3 hinge property data.   
 
    Figure 4-8:  Deformation-Controlled M3 Hinge Data 
 
The points A-B-C-D-E are color-coded and valued as a ratio of the yield 
moment and yield rotation of the structural material.  For instance, Point B has a 
value of 1, since it represents the yield moment.  The performance acceptance criteria 
is shown at the bottom of the window.  The Immediate Occupancy performance level 
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occurs at one-third the distance between the yield moment (Point B) and the ultimate 
moment (Point C), or two times the yield rotation.  The Life Safety Performance 
Level occurs at two-thirds the distance between Point B and Point C, or four times the 
yield rotation.  The Collapse Prevention performance level occurs at Point C, the 
ultimate strength, or at six times the yield rotation.  Point E is colored in red and 
denotes collapse of the structure.   
The nonlinear analysis output uses these color-coded nodes to represent hinge 
performance.  This study will use this information in order to estimate possible 
consequences of a blast attack occurring above the bridge deck.     
4.5 Consequence Assessment 
After analyzing the bridge responses to the blast loading, the consequences of 
the attack can be estimated.  By knowing the possible consequences and their 
associated costs, the bridge owner can make informed decisions regarding how to 
allocate risk mitigation and countermeasure funding and efforts.  Comparing the 
results for different bridge functional types can be beneficial, whether the bridge 
owner is concerned with one long-span bridge with multiple bridge types, or an 
inventory of bridge facilities.   
Before describing the procedure, it should be noted that the author of this 
thesis is in no way an expert in consequence assessment.  The proposed method for 
estimating the consequences of an attack is a way to present the results of the 
structural analysis.  Using performance levels is a rational means of measuring 
structural damage; however, the author hopes that the proposed application will 
stimulate future research.  More research is needed to develop the relationship 
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between performance levels and structural damage, number of casualties, and bridge 
downtime.  
 In order to estimate consequences, reliable data sources are needed.  Sources 
of information include in-house databases and historical records, similar studies, 
analytical or probabilistic analyses, or expert elicitation.  The seismic community has 
used these resources to develop probabilistic models to quantify the economic effects 
of earthquakes [20].  However, a study involving terrorist attacks has limited sources 
of data.  There is not a database with the damage records of bridges that have 
experienced an explosive attack.  Compared to weather-related and natural disasters, 
terrorist attacks are few and far between, and the data necessary to create sound 
analytical models does not exist.  For these reasons, the approach proposed in this 
thesis uses a performance-based structural analysis and probabilistic-based method to 
assess the consequences of a terrorist attack on a bridge.   
 There are many possible consequences of a blast attack on a bridge.  This 
study quantifies the monetary costs of the three consequences proposed in the next 
generation seismic performance guidelines [6] and the BRP Report [2]:  structural 
damage, casualties, and downtime.  The cost of structural damage includes the cost to 
repair or replace the bridge structure.  The cost of casualties includes the value of any 
loss of life.  The costs of bridge downtime include monetary losses associated with 
the bridge being closed for repair or replacement.  In this study, downtime costs 
quantified are losses in toll revenue and user detour costs. 
The consequences are expressed by a uniform probability distribution with a 
lower and upper limit.  A uniform distribution is used as a means of demonstration.  
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Other probability distributions can be applied if more information about the 
consequences is known. 
4.5.1  Structural Damage 
The most apparent consequence of an attack on a bridge is physical damage to 
the structure.  Using a relationship between performance levels and replacement cost, 
the cost of the structural damage is quantified.  At an IRCC-PEER workshop on 
performance-based seismic design, a presentation estimated the percent of structure 
replacement cost at each of the three performance levels:  Immediate Occupancy, Life 
Safety, and Collapse Prevention [22].  The relationship is shown in Table 4-4.     
             Table 4-4:  Replacement Cost by Performance Level 
Immediate Occupancy (IO) 25%
Life Safety (LS) 50%
Collapse Prevention (CP) 100%
% of 
Replacement 
Cost
Performance Level
 
At the CP performance level, the structure requires approximately 100% 
replacement.  This means that for this study, any structural performance equal to or 
greater than the Collapse Prevention performance level (e.g. Points C, D and E in 
Figure 4-8) is characterized as total failure.  Using Table 4-4’s percentages, 
SAP2000’s structural analysis output and bridge cost information, the cost of 
structural damage can be quantified for each attack scenario and bridge type.     
 The California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) has estimated 
comparative bridge costs4 for different bridge types [8], as shown in Table 4-5.  
                                                 
4  “These costs are the ‘bridge costs’ only and do not include items such as:  bridge removal, approach 
slabs, slope paving, soundwalls or retaining walls” [8]. 
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CALTRANS provides a cost range based on common span lengths.  The costs are 
recommended to be used as “general guidelines for structure type selection and its 
relative cost” [8].  This information is used to estimate the replacement costs of the 
prestressed concrete beam and steel plate girder bridges. 
Table 4-5:  CALTRANS Comparative Bridge Costs [8] 
RC SLAB 16 - 44 130 - 210
RC T-BEAM 40 - 60 150 - 275
RC BOX 50 - 120 160 - 270
CIP/PS SLAB 40 - 65 160 - 205
CIP/PS BOX 100 - 250 150 - 230
PC/PS SLAB
BULB T GIRDER 90 - 145 180 - 280
PC/PS  I GIRDER   50 - 120 200 - 260
PC/PS BOX 120 - 200 220 - 395
STRUCT STEEL
I  GIRDER
STRUCTURAL SECTION COMMON SPAN RANGE (feet)
COST RANGE       
($ / Square foot)
20 - 50 195 - 270
PC/PS 30 - 120 200 - 270
60 - 300 240 - 370
 
 
 
 
 
  
 For the steel deck cantilever truss bridge, CALTRANS does not provide an 
estimated cost.  However, other data sources can be used.  Construction contract data 
was obtained from the agency responsible for the bridge used in the case studies, in 
order to estimate the replacement cost.  Table 4-6 shows a range of possible bridge 
costs for each bridge type, measured in square feet of bridge deck. 
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Table 4-6:  Replacement Bridge Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pre-stressed Concrete Beam (PC) 60 200 260
Steel Plate Girder (SG) 3@202 240 370
Deck Cantilever Truss (DT) 1350 350 510
Estimated Replacement Cost ($/ft2)
Bridge Type Spans (ft)
 
 Using SAP2000’s output, the amount of damaged area, in square feet, for each 
performance level is estimated for each bridge type and attack scenario.  The 
damaged area is multiplied by the values in Table 4-4 to yield the lower and upper 
limits of structural damage cost, (Ci,S)Blow and (Ci,S)Bhigh, respectively.  Equations 4.2 
and 4.3 calculate these values for each attack scenario and bridge type.  In order to 
account for uncertainty in these costs, a uniform probability distribution is assigned to 
this cost range.     
(Ci,S)Blow = (25%)(R1)B(Ai,IO)B + (50%)(R1)B(Ai,LS)B + (100%)(R1)B(Ai,CP)B           (4.2) 
(Ci,S)Bhigh = (25%)(R2)B(Ai,IO)B + (50%)(R2)B( Ai,LS)B + (100%)(R2)B( Ai,CP)B        (4.3) 
  Where  i = attack scenario number 
   B = bridge type:  PC, SG, or DT 
   R1 = lower limit of replacement cost (from Table 4-6) 
   R2 = upper limit of replacement cost (from Table 4-6) 
   A = damaged area by performance level:  IO, LS, or CP 
The mean and standard deviation of the uniform distribution can be calculated 
as (Ci,S)B and (σi,S)B, respectively, for each attack scenario and bridge type.  These are 
the expected costs associated with structural damage.  
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4.5.2  Casualties 
As with any explosion, there are risks to human lives if an attack occurs on a 
bridge deck.  Quantifying the number of casualties and converting this number to a 
monetary loss is a challenge in any consequence analysis.  The first step in doing so is 
to assign value of a human life, which is a difficult task, as it is subjective.  Different 
organizations assign different values to a human life, depending on the situation.  
However, for this study, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s value of life will be 
used, since this is an incident occurring on the national highway system.  In 2002, the 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum to revise a DOT 
published guide entitled “Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing 
Economic Evaluations” [26].  The memo recommends that the value of life used in all 
DOT analyses be raised from $2.7 million to $3 million.  This $3 million figure is 
used in this study. 
 The structural response in terms of performance levels are used quantify the 
number of casualties.  Since any structural response greater than or equal to the 
Collapse Prevention performance level is considered total failure, any vehicles in this 
damaged area are in jeopardy.  Peak hour traffic data or field surveys can aid in 
estimating how many vehicles could possibly be on the bridge at any one time.  
Assuming the vehicles are uniformly distributed across the bridge’s deck area, the 
percent of failed bridge area is proportional to the number of cars in that area.  The 
ratio of failed bridge area for attack scenario can be calculated by dividing the 
damaged area in or above the Collapse Prevention performance level (Ai,CP) by the 
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total surface area of that bridge type (A).  This value is designated as the Failure 
Ratio and is calculated in Equation 4.4 
Failure Ratio = %100
A
A
)(F
B
CPi,B
i ×⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=    (4.4) 
The Failure Ratio is multiplied by maximum number of vehicles on the bridge 
at any one time (Vpeak) in order to estimate the maximum number of vehicles in the 
failed area.  Using transportation study estimates of 1.2 persons per vehicle (n), the 
cost of casualties is calculated.  Again, to account for uncertainty, a uniform 
distribution is applied to this situation, with zero casualties as the lower limit (since it 
is possible that no vehicles are in the failed area).  Equation 4.6 calculates the upper 
limit of casualty cost. 
  (Ci,C)Blow = 0       (4.5) 
  (Ci,C)Bhigh = person
$3MnV)(F peak
B
i ×××     (4.6) 
The mean and standard deviation of the uniform distribution can be calculated 
as (Ci,C)B and (σi,C)B, respectively, for each attack scenario (i) and bridge type (B).  
These values represent the expected costs of casualties as a result of the attack. 
4.5.3  Downtime 
There are indirect consequences associated with the time that the bridge 
remains closed to traffic for structural repairs or replacement.  Examples include 
losses in toll revenue (if the bridge is a toll facility), user delay costs, user detour 
costs, and economic impacts on surrounding businesses.  This study will quantify toll 
revenue losses and user detour costs as a means of demonstration. 
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 Before assessing these consequences, the bridge downtime is estimated.  First, 
one must know the amount of time necessary for full bridge replacement.  In the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack, it is assumed that design and construction of repairs 
would have an accelerated schedule.  Keeping this in mind, Table 4-7 displays a 
range of bridge replacement times (T1 and T2) for each bridge type and span length. 
Table 4-7:  Bridge Replacement Times 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
60' PC Beam 2 4 60 120
606' Steel Girder 6 8 180 240
1350' Deck Truss 14 16 420 480
Replacement Time (days)Bridge Type and 
Length
Replacement Time (months)
 
 The time needed to complete repairs on the bridge will depend on how much 
of the bridge needs replacement.  The percent of bridge replacement is calculated 
using the Failure Ratio in Equation 4.4, based on the amount of damaged area in or 
above the Collapse Prevention performance level.  Then, the Failure Ratio is 
multiplied by the range of replacement time, yielding a lower and upper bound of 
downtime.   
  (Di)Blow =      (4.7) B1
B
i )(T)(F ×
  (Di)Bhigh =      (4.8) B2
B
i )(T)(F ×
 This procedure uses the assumption that downtime depends solely on the 
portion of bridge that requires replacement (damaged area greater than or equal to the 
CP performance level).  This means that other parts of the bridge that fall in the 
Immediate Occupancy or Life Safety performance levels, and need more minor 
repairs, will be repaired during time allotted to replace the failed area.   
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4.5.3.1  Toll Revenue Losses 
 
The bridge used in the case studies is a toll facility.  Any amount of time that 
the bridge remains closed, the agency responsible loses toll revenue.  This could have 
a significant impact on the agency, depending on how many facilities are in the 
agency’s inventory, as well as how important the particular bridge facility is to its 
revenue.  The total loss in toll revenue for each attack scenario (i) and bridge type 
(B), designated (Ci,D1)B, can be found by multiplying the bridge’s average annual 
daily traffic (AADT) by the toll rate per vehicle (r) and downtime (Di)B.  Equations 
4.9 and 4.10 calculate the lower and upper limit of the toll revenue loss range.  A 
uniform distribution is applied to this range to account for uncertainty. 
  (Ci,D1)Blow =     (4.9) lowBi )(DrAADT ××
  (Ci,D1)Bhigh =     (4.10) highBi )(DrAADT ××
For the case studies in Chapters 5-7, the AADT is 30,000 vehicles per day and 
the toll rate is $2.00 per vehicle.5 
4.5.3.2 User Detour Cost 
 
While the bridge remains closed, vehicles are forced to use an alternate route.  
The user detour cost, denoted CD2, can be calculated by multiplying the bridge’s 
AADT by the user value of time (u), detour time, and bridge downtime.  The detour 
time is defined as two times the distance from the bridge to the nearest alternate route 
(d), divided by the average speed on the detour (ν).  The user value of time is based 
on the average annual income in the area, which can be broken down into an hourly 
                                                 
5 Toll facilities often collect different toll rates for different vehicle classes.  This can be taken into 
account by apportioning the AADT by vehicle class and multiplying by the appropriate toll rate.  For 
simplicity and so as not to indicate the actual facility used for the case studies, a $2.00 toll rate is used 
for all vehicles. 
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rate.  For the purposes of this study, the average user’s value of time will be used 
synonymously with the average vehicle’s value of time.   
  (Ci,D2)Blow = lowBi )(Dν
2duAADT ×××    (4.11) 
  (Ci,D2)Bhigh = highBi )(Dν
2duAADT ×××    (4.12) 
 For the case studies in Chapters 5-7, the AADT is 30,000 vehicles per day.  
The user value of time (u) is $22.50 per hour.  The distance from the bridge to the 
nearest alternate route (d) is 50 miles, and the average speed (ν) on the detour is 60 
mph. 
4.5.3.3  Total Downtime Cost 
 
 The total cost of bridge downtime is the sum of the individual downtime 
consequence costs.  To find the lower and upper limit for the downtime cost range, 
use Equations 4.13 and 4.14. 
  (Ci,D)Blow =  (Ci,D1)Blow + (Ci,D2)Blow    (4.13) 
  (Ci,D)Bhigh =  (Ci,D1)Bhigh + (Ci,D2)Bhigh    (4.14) 
The mean and standard deviation of the uniform distribution can be calculated 
as (Ci,D)B and (σi,D)B, respectively, for each attack scenario (i) and bridge type (B).  
These values represent the expected costs of the bridge downtime after the attack. 
4.5.4  Total Consequence Cost 
After quantifying the costs of structural damage (Ci,S)B, casualties (Ci,C)B, and 
bridge downtime (Ci,D)B, the expected cost of the consequences E[(Ci)B] and standard 
deviation (σi)B can be calculated for each attack scenario (i) and bridge type (B).   
E[(Ci)B] = (Ci,S)B + (Ci,C)B + (Ci,D)B    (4.15) 
 54 
 
 
(σi)B =  2BDi,
2B
Ci,
2B
Si, ])[(σ])[(σ])[(σ ++      (4.16) 
 The expected consequence cost E[CB] and standard deviation σB for each 
bridge type can then be estimated.  Equations 4.17 and 4.18 show these calculations, 
where N is the number of attack scenarios.   
E[CB]  =  ∑
=
N
1i
B
i ])E[(CN
1      (4.17) 
∑
=
−=
N
1i
2BB
i
B ]}E[C]){E[(C
N
1σ     (4.18) 
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5.0  CASE STUDY 1:  PRESTRESSED CONCRETE (PC) 
BEAM BRIDGE 
 
 
 
 Case Study 1 demonstrates the proposed method on a prestressed concrete 
beam bridge.  First, general information about the span’s geometry and material 
properties is provided.  
5.1  Geometry and Material Properties 
The bridge plans were obtained by the agency responsible for the long-span 
bridge used in this study.  The bridge was designed using AASHTO’s Standard 
Specifications for Highway Bridges for an HS20-44 live load.  A representative 
prestressed concrete beam span is simply supported, 60’ in length and 39’8” wide.  
There are six AASHTO Type III beams, spaced 7’2” center-to-center.  Figure 5-1 
shows bridge’s typical half section, with symmetry occurring at the center line. 
 
Figure 5-1:  Prestressed Concrete Beam Typical Half Section 
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The bridge deck is 7” thick, which includes a ½” monolithic wearing surface.  
The AASHTO Type III beam cross-section dimensions and prestressing tendon 
layout is shown in Figure 5-2.  Section A-A corresponds the end of the bridge, while 
Section B-B is the beam cross-section at the bridge midspan.   
 
    Figure 5-2:  AASHTO Type III Beam Cross-sections  
 
 The prestressed beam concrete has a minimum 28-day compressive strength 
of 5,000 psi and a minimum compressive strength of 4,000 psi at transfer of stressing 
force.  The prestressing tendons are number 7 wire, with ½” diameter and a cross-
sectional area of 0.153 in2.  The capacity of the wire is 270 ksi. 
5.2  Attack Scenarios 
The five attack scenarios for the PC beam bridge are restated in Table 5-1.  
Each scenario is characterized by a charge weight of TNT and location along the 
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bridge’s 60’ length.  As explained in Chapter 4, the charge weight and locations were 
assigned probability distributions and randomly generated.   
           Table 5-1:  Attack Scenarios for PC Beam Bridge 
Attack 
Scenario
Charge Weight 
(lbs TNT)
Blast Location Along 
Bridge Length (ft)
1 674 34
2 1009 44
3 437 13
4 2911 36
5 1821 21  
5.3  Bridge Model 
SAP2000 is used to create a model of the prestressed concrete beam bridge.  
The “Bridge Wizard” module is used to create the typical section and layout of the 
bridge.  The Bridge Wizard’s step by step guide allows the user to choose a section 
and input the geometry and materials of the bridge. The module automatically meshes 
the elements and creates a finite element model.  Joints are automatically created 
along the centerlines of the PC beams. 
5.3.1  Bridge Deck 
Since this study is concerned with the response of the deck as well as the 
beams, the deck is also modeled using frame elements.  By defining the deck as frame 
elements, nonlinear hinges can be assigned, so the deck will exhibit nonlinear plastic 
behavior.  In order to properly model the bridge deck and account for transverse and 
longitudinal stiffness, a grid of frame elements is created.  The deck frame elements 
are connected to the automatically generated joints along the prestressed concrete 
beam centerlines.  Four frame elements are defined, two in the transverse direction 
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and two in the longitudinal direction.  Deck Sections 1 and 2 are in the transverse 
direction, while Deck Sections 3 and 4 are in the longitudinal direction.  Figure 5-3 
shows a cross section of the deck frame elements. 
Width (varies) 
Depth 
7” 
    
    Figure 5-3:  Prestressed Concrete Beam Bridge Deck Section 
 
The width of the deck sections are calculated via the beam tributary area 
concept.  First, a few distances must be defined.  The distance between joints along 
the centerline of the concrete beams in the longitudinal direction is designated as “b” 
and equal to 10’ (120”).  The spacing between the concrete beams in the transverse 
direction is designated as “s” and equal to 7’2” (86”).  The overhang distance 
between the exterior concrete beams and the edge of the bridge is designated as “o” 
and equal to 1’11” (23”).    
Deck Section 1 falls along the end of the bridge in the transverse direction.  
The width of this section is equal to half the distance between joints along the 
concrete beams, or b/2.  Deck Section 2 is also in the transverse direction, with a 
width equal to the spacing between joints, or b.  Deck Section 3 falls in the 
longitudinal direction along the exterior concrete beams, so the width is defined as the 
overhang distance plus half the beam spacing, or o + s/2.  Deck Section 4 elements, 
also in the longitudinal direction, are along the interior beams with a width equal to 
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the beam spacing, s.  Table 5-2 summarizes the deck frame elements used to model 
the bridge deck, and Figure 5-4 shows the deck “grid.” 
Table 5-2:  Prestressed Concrete Beam Bridge Deck Elements 
Deck Section Direction Depth (in)
1 Transverse 7 b/2 60
2 Transverse 7 b 120
3 Longitudinal 7 o + s/2 66
4 Longitudinal 7 s 86
Width (in)
 
 
Figure 5-4:  Grid of Deck Frame Elements for PC Beam Bridge 
 
5.3.2  Tendons 
As Figure 5-2 shows, AASHTO Type III beams have 20 prestressing tendons.  
SAP2000 allows prestressed tendons to be modeled as forces or elements.  For the 
purposes of this study, the tendons are modeled as frame elements.  Four of these 
tendons are deflected strands that vary along the beam length.  The remaining 16 
strands are linear along the beam length.  Using the center of mass, the four deflected 
tendons are modeled together, with a cross-sectional area equal to four times the area 
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of one tendon, or 0.612 in2.  The straight tendons are also modeled as one tendon, 
with a cross-sectional area equal to 2.448 in2.  Figure 5-5 illustrates the tendon layout.   
 
Figure 5-5:  Prestressing Tendon Layout 
 
5.3.3  Completed Model 
Figure 5-6 shows the SAP2000 model for the 60’ prestressed concrete beam 
bridge, in a 3D view of the cross-section. 
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Figure 5-6:  SAP2000 Model of Prestressed Concrete Beam Bridge 
 
 5.4  Apply Attack Scenarios to PC Beam Bridge Model 
Using the procedure outlined in Chapter 4, the static equivalent loads of each 
attack scenario are calculated.  Table 5-3 displays these calculations for Attack 
Scenario 1 as an example.  All five attack scenario’s calculations can be found in the 
Appendix.  First, the coordinates of the automatically generated joints along the 
concrete beams are entered.  Next, the distance in the plane of the bridge deck is 
found between the blast centroid and each bridge joint, denoted as X.  Using X and 
the height of the blast (Z), the distance from the blast centroid to each joint (D) and 
the angle of incidence (θi) is calculated.  Entering the values of D and θi into AT-
Blast yields the static pressure at each joint.  Using the tributary area method, the 
pressure is resolved into joint loads.  In the tables below, the pressures highlighted in 
yellow are greater than or equal to 200 psi, so these pressures’ corresponding joint 
loads are applied to the PC beam bridge model. 
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Table 5-3:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 38 4 39
30
23
19
19
24
32
36
27
18
12
13
20
28
34
25
15
7
8
17
27
34
25
15
7
8
17
27
36
27
18
12
13
20
28
39
30
23
19
19
24
32
84 59.19 27.50 234
2 10 17.92 30 4 82 119.43 55.00 946
3 20 17.92 23 4 80 233.64 55.00 1850
4 30 17.92 18 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
5 40 17.92 19 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
6 50 17.92 24 4 81 197.09 55.00 1561
7 60 17.92 32 4 83 100.12 27.50 396
1 0 10.75 36 4 84 73.51 35.83 379
2 10 10.75 26 4 81 150.43 71.67 1552
3 20 10.75 18 4 77 321.06 71.67 3313
4 30 10.75 11 4 71 784.48 71.67 8096
5 40 10.75 12 4 72 668.49 71.67 6899
6 50 10.75 19 4 78 306.30 71.67 3161
7 60 10.75 28 4 82 137.49 35.83 709
1 0 3.58 34 4 83 86.82 35.83 448
2 10 3.58 24 4 81 173.95 71.67 1795
3 20 3.58 14 4 75 472.39 71.67 4875
4 30 3.58 5 4 53 7869.88 71.67 81217
5 40 3.58 7 4 60 3487.37 71.67 35990
6 50 3.58 16 4 76 365.83 71.67 3775
7 60 3.58 26 4 81 150.43 35.83 776
1 0 -3.58 34 4 83 86.82 35.83 448
2 10 -3.58 24 4 81 173.95 71.67 1795
3 20 -3.58 14 4 75 472.39 71.67 4875
4 30 -3.58 5 4 53 7869.88 71.67 81217
5 40 -3.58 7 4 60 3487.37 71.67 35990
6 50 -3.58 16 4 76 365.83 71.67 3775
7 60 -3.53 26 4 81 150.43 35.83 776
1 0 -10.75 36 4 84 73.51 35.83 379
2 10 -10.75 26 4 81 150.43 71.67 1552
3 20 -10.75 18 4 77 321.06 71.67 3313
4 30 -10.75 11 4 71 784.48 71.67 8096
5 40 -10.75 12 4 72 668.49 71.67 6899
6 50 -10.75 19 4 78 306.30 71.67 3161
7 60 -10.75 28 4 82 137.49 35.83 709
1 0 -17.92 38 4 84 59.19 27.50 234
2 10 -17.92 30 4 82 119.43 55.00 946
3 20 -17.92 23 4 80 233.64 55.00 1850
4 30 -17.92 18 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
5 40 -17.92 19 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
6 50 -17.92 24 4 81 197.09 55.00 1561
7 60 -17.92 32 4 83 100.12 27.50 396
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Figure 5-7 shows the static equivalent joint loads for Attack Scenario 1 
applied to the prestressed concrete beam bridge model in SAP2000.   
 
Figure 5-7:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
5.5  Analyze Structural Response 
Now that the equivalent static loads of the blast are applied to the bridge 
model, the analysis is run.  SAP2000’s nonlinear static analysis output shows the 
performance of structural members’ plastic hinges.  The nodes are color-coded, as 
shown in Figure 4-8, to represent the hinge’s state on the moment-rotation or force-
deformation curve.   
 The analysis saves multiple response steps.  Figures 5-8 through 5-12 show 
the final response steps for each attack scenario.  
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Figure 5-8:  Attack Scenario 1 Response (Step 11) 
 
 
Figure 5-9:  Attack Scenario 2 Response (Step 11) 
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Figure 5-10:  Attack Scenario 3 Response (Step 11) 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11:  Attack Scenario 4 Response (Step 11) 
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Figure 5-12:  Attack Scenario 5 Response (Step 11) 
 
 
5.6  Consequence Assessment 
For the prestressed concrete beam bridge, the consequences are estimated 
using the method described in Chapter 4.5.   
5.6.1  Structural Damage 
Figures 5-8 through 5-12 reveal that the PC beam bridge experiences total 
failure in every attack scenario.  Therefore, the bridge will have to be replaced.  This 
simplifies the quantification of damaged areas by performance levels.  Table 5-4 
summarizes the structural damage and associated costs. 
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Table 5-4:  PC Beam Bridge Structural Damage Costs 
≥ IO ≥ LS ≥ CP Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 - - 2,380 476,000 618,800
2 - - 2,380 476,000 618,800
3 - - 2,380 476,000 618,800
4 - - 2,380 476,000 618,800
5 - - 2,380 476,000 618,800
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Structural Damage Cost ($) 
(Ci,S)PC
Damaged Area by Performance Level (ft2)
   
 
5.6.2  Casualties 
Based on the peak hour traffic data, the number of vehicles on the 60’ bridge 
at any time (Vpeak) is four vehicles.  Equations 4.5 and 4.6 yield the estimated cost of 
casualties, as shown in Table 5-5. 
          Table 5-5:  Cost of Casualties for PC Beam Bridge 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 100% 4 0 14,400,000
2 100% 4 0 14,400,000
3 100% 4 0 14,400,000
4 100% 4 0 14,400,000
5 100% 4 0 14,400,000
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Cost of Casualties ($)              
(Ci,C)PC
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)PC
(Fi)*Vpeak 
(vehicles)
 
5.6.3  Downtime 
Using the Failure Ratio and bridge replacement times, Equations  4.7 and 4.8 
are used to calculate upper and lower limit of bridge downtime for each attack 
scenario, as Table 5-6 displays.  Equations 4.9 - 4.12 calculate the cost ranges for toll 
revenue loss and user delay.  The results are shown in Table 5-7. 
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                        Table 5-6:  PC Beam Bridge Downtime 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 100% 60 120
2 100% 60 120
3 100% 60 120
4 100% 60 120
5 100% 60 120
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)PC
Downtime (days)                (Di)PC
 
 
            Table 5-7:  PC Beam Bridge Downtime Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 3,600,000 7,200,000 67,500,000 135,000,000
2 3,600,000 7,200,000 67,500,000 135,000,000
3 3,600,000 7,200,000 67,500,000 135,000,000
4 3,600,000 7,200,000 67,500,000 135,000,000
5 3,600,000 7,200,000 67,500,000 135,000,000
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Lost Toll Revenue ($)    (Ci,D1)PC User Detour Cost ($)     (Ci,D2)PC
 
 
5.6.4  Total Consequences for PC Beam Bridge 
Equations 4.15 and 4.16 calculate the expected cost of the consequences 
E[(Ci)PC] and standard deviation (σi)PC for each attack scenario.  Finally, the expected 
consequence cost, E[CPC], and standard deviation (σPC) for the prestressed concrete 
beam bridge type is estimated using Equations 4.17 and 4.18.  Table 5-8 summarizes 
these consequence costs.  
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Table 5-8:  PC Beam Bridge Consequence Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Structural Damage 476,000 618,800 547,400 41,223
Casualties 0 14,400,000 7,200,000 4,156,922
Downtime 71,100,000 142,200,000 106,650,000 20,524,802
E[(C1)PC] 114,397,400 20,941,566
Structural Damage 476,000 618,800 547,400 41,223
Casualties 0 14,400,000 7,200,000 4,156,922
Downtime 71,100,000 142,200,000 106,650,000 20,524,802
E[(C2)PC] 114,397,400 20,941,566
Structural Damage 476,000 618,800 547,400 41,223
Casualties 0 14,400,000 7,200,000 4,156,922
Downtime 71,100,000 142,200,000 106,650,000 20,524,802
E[(C3)PC] 114,397,400 20,941,566
Structural Damage 476,000 618,800 547,400 41,223
Casualties 0 14,400,000 7,200,000 4,156,922
Downtime 71,100,000 142,200,000 106,650,000 20,524,802
E[(C4)PC] 114,397,400 20,941,566
Structural Damage 476,000 618,800 547,400 41,223
Casualties 0 14,400,000 7,200,000 4,156,922
Downtime 71,100,000 142,200,000 106,650,000 20,524,802
E[(C5)PC] 114,397,400 20,941,566
$114,397,400 -
Mean ($) (Ci)PC
Std Dev ($) 
(σi)PC
5
i
Expected Consequence Costs, E[CPC]
Cost ($)
Consequence
1
2
3
4
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6.0  CASE STUDY 2:  STEEL PLATE GIRDER (SG) 
BRIDGE 
 
 
 
 Case Study 2 demonstrates the proposed method outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 
on a three-span continuous steel plate girder (SG) bridge.  Before the method is 
demonstrated, general information about the span’s geometry and material properties 
is provided. 
6.1  Geometry and Material Properties 
The bridge plans were obtained by the agency responsible for the long-span 
bridge used in this study.  The bridge was designed using AASHTO’s Standard 
Specifications for Highway Bridges for an HS20-44 live load.  The SG bridge is a 
continuous three-span bridge.  Each span is 202’ long, totaling 606’.  The 6.5” 
concrete deck slab is 38’4” wide.  There are two steel built-up plate girders and five 
rolled beam stringers.  The plate girders are spaced 28’ center-to-center.  Between the 
plate girders, the interior stringers are spaced 7’ apart.  The exterior stringers are 4’7” 
center-to-center from the plate girders.  Figure 6-1 shows the bridge’s typical section 
and girder/stringer numbering scheme. 
 
Figure 6-1:  Continuous Steel Plate Girder Bridge Typical Section 
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6.1.1  Steel Plate Girders and Stringers 
All structural steel sections are A36 carbon steel, and the concrete deck 
lightweight concrete.  The stringers are W16x40 rolled beams, and the plate girder 
sections vary along the bridge length.  There are three different plate girder sections, 
each having a constant web plate depth of 120”.  The web thickness varies along the 
plate girder from 83 ” to 167 ”.  The plate girder flange plates are 30” wide, with a 
thickness that ranges from 1 165 ” to 2 ¼”.  The Appendix also contains a girder 
elevation view that displays the plate girder dimension variations.  
6.2  Attack Scenarios 
The five attack scenarios for the steel plate girder bridge are restated in Table 
6-1.  Each scenario is characterized by a charge weight of TNT and location along the 
bridge’s 606’ length.  As explained in Chapter 4, the charge weight and location were 
assigned probability distributions and randomly generated.   
                           Table 6-1:  Attack Scenarios for Steel PG Bridge 
Attack 
Scenario
Charge Weight 
(lbs TNT)
Blast Location Along 
Bridge Length (ft)
1 674 347
2 1009 444
3 437 130
4 2911 361
5 1821 209  
6.3  Bridge Model 
A model of the three-span continuous plate girder bridge is created in 
SAP2000.  The “Bridge Wizard” module aided in defining the typical section and 
materials of the bridge.  The Bridge Wizard’s step by step guide allows the user to 
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choose a section and input the geometry and materials of the bridge.  At a minimum, 
a bridge layout line, deck section, and bridge object must be defined.  The module 
automatically meshes the elements and creates a finite element model.  Joints are 
automatically created along the centerlines of the plate girders and stringers.  
6.3.1  Bridge Deck 
Since this study is concerned with the response of the major structural 
elements (e.g. plate girders, stringers, deck), the deck is modeled using frame 
elements.  By defining the deck as frame elements, nonlinear hinges can be assigned, 
so the deck will exhibit nonlinear plastic behavior.  In order to properly model the 
bridge deck and show transverse and longitudinal stiffness, a grid of frame elements 
is created.  The deck frame elements are connected to the automatically generated 
joints along the plate girder and stringer centerlines.  Four frame elements were 
defined, two in the transverse direction and three in the longitudinal direction.  Deck 
Sections 1 and 2 are in the transverse direction, while Deck Sections 3 - 5 are in the 
longitudinal direction.  Figure 6-2 shows a cross section of the deck frame elements. 
Width (varies) 
Depth 
6.5” 
    
        Figure 6-2:  Plate Girder Bridge Deck Section 
 
The width of the deck sections are calculated via the girder tributary area 
concept.  First, a few distances must be defined.  The distance between joints along 
the centerline of the plate girders and stringers in the longitudinal direction is 
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designated as “b” and equal to 8.5’ (102”).  The distance between the plate girders 
and exterior stringers is designated as “s1” and equal to 4’7” (55”).  The spacing 
between the plate girders and interior stringers in the transverse direction is 
designated as “s2” and equal to 7’ (84”).    The overhang distance between the 
exterior stringers and the bridge edge is designated as “o” and equal to 7”.    
Deck Section 1 is along the end of the bridge in the transverse direction.  The 
width of this section is equal to half the distance between joints along the plate 
girders and stringers, or b/2.  Deck Section 2 is also in the transverse direction, with a 
width equal to the spacing between joints, or b.  Deck Section 3 falls in the 
longitudinal direction along the exterior stringers, so the width is defined as the 
overhang distance plus half the beam spacing, or (o + s1/2).  Deck Section 4 elements, 
also in the longitudinal direction, are along the plate girders with a width equal to 
(s1+s2)/2.  Finally, Deck Section 5 elements are in the longitudinal direction along the 
interior stringers, with a width equal to their center-to-center spacing, or s2.  Table 6-2 
summarizes the deck frame elements used to model the bridge deck, and Figure 6-3 
shows a plan view of the deck “grid” at the left end of the bridge model. 
Table 6-2:  Continuous Steel Plate Girder Bridge Deck Elements 
Deck Section Direction Depth (in) Width (in) 
1 Transverse 6.5 b/2 51 
2 Transverse 6.5 b  102 
3 Longitudinal 6.5 o + (s1/2) 34.5 
4 Longitudinal 6.5 (s1+s2)/2 69.5 
5 Longitudinal 6.5 s2 84 
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Figure 6-3:  Grid of Deck Frame Elements for PG Bridge 
 
6.3.2  Abutments and Bents 
The bridge is modeled with abutments at both ends and two intermediate 
bents.  Each bent consists of a concrete cap beam and two concrete columns, all 
having a rectangular cross-section.  The cap beam is 34’ long with a 6’ depth and 7’ 
width.  The columns are approximately 70’ in height, spaced 28’ feet apart.  They 
each have a depth of 7’ and a width of 6’.  Figure 6-4 shows a plan view of the bent 
cap.   
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      Figure 6-4:  Bent Cap Beam  
 
 
6.3.3  Completed Model 
Figure 6-5 shows a 3D view of the model for the 606’ continuous plate girder 
bridge. 
 
Figure 6-5:  SAP2000 Model of Continuous Steel PG Bridge 
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6.4  Apply Attack Scenarios to SG Bridge Model 
Using the procedure outlined in Chapter 4, the static equivalent loads of each 
attack scenario are calculated.  Table 6-3 displays these calculations for Attack 
Scenario 1 as an example.  All five attack scenario’s calculations can be found in the 
Appendix.  First, the coordinates of the automatically generated joints along the plate 
girders and stringers are entered.  Next, the distance (in the plane of the bridge deck) 
is found between the blast centroid and each bridge joint, denoted as X.  Using X and 
the height of the blast (Z) the distance from the blast centroid to each joint (D) and 
the angle of incidence (θi) is calculated.  Entering the values of D and θi into AT-
Blast yields the static pressure at each joint.  Using the tributary area method, the 
pressure is resolved into joint loads.  In the tables below, the pressures highlighted in 
yellow are greater than or equal to 200 psi, so these pressures’ corresponding joint 
loads are applied to the PG bridge model. 
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Table 6-3:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Load Calculations6 
x y
35 312.75 18.58 39 4 39
31
24
20
20
24
31
39
37
29
21
15
15
21
28
37
35
26
17
9
9
17
26
35
34
25
15
6
6
15
25
34
84 59.19 27.98 239
36 322.5 18.58 31 4 83 107.86 27.98 435
37 332.25 18.58 24 4 80 205.34 27.98 827
38 342 18.58 19 4 78 306.30 27.98 1234
39 351.75 18.58 19 4 78 306.30 27.98 1234
40 361.5 18.58 24 4 80 205.34 27.98 827
41 371.25 18.58 31 4 83 107.86 27.98 435
42 381 18.58 39 4 84 59.19 25.00 213
35 312.75 14 37 4 84 68.22 56.45 555
36 322.5 14 28 4 82 128.05 56.45 1041
37 332.25 14 20 4 79 290.81 56.45 2364
38 342 14 15 4 75 472.39 56.45 3840
39 351.75 14 15 4 75 472.39 56.45 3840
40 361.5 14 20 4 79 290.81 56.45 2364
41 371.25 14 28 4 82 137.49 56.45 1118
42 381 14 37 4 84 68.22 50.43 495
35 312.75 7 35 4 83 81.09 68.25 797
36 322.5 7 25 4 81 161.43 68.25 1587
37 332.25 7 16 4 76 365.83 68.25 3595
38 342 7 9 4 65 1833.63 68.25 18021
39 351.75 7 8 4 65 1833.63 68.25 18021
40 361.5 7 16 4 76 365.83 68.25 3595
41 371.25 7 25 4 81 161.43 68.25 1587
42 381 7 35 4 83 81.09 60.97 712
35 312.75 0 34 4 83 86.82 68.25 853
36 322.5 0 25 4 81 173.85 68.25 1709
37 332.25 0 15 4 75 472.39 68.25 4643
38 342 0 5 4 51 11320.26 68.25 111256
39 351.75 0 5 4 50 12000.89 68.25 117945
40 361.5 0 15 4 75 472.39 68.25 4643
41 371.25 0 24 4 81 173.95 68.25 1710
42 381 0 34 4 83 86.82 60.97 762
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 Figure 6-6 shows Attack Scenario 1’s static equivalent joint loads applied to 
the plate girder bridge model.  Figures for all five attack scenario’s loading can be 
found in the Appendix. 
                                                 
6 Because of the symmetry of the bridge’s typical section, the load calculations for Stringer 1, Plate 
Girder 1, and Stringer 2 also apply to Stringer 5, Plate Girder 2, and Stringer 4, respectively. 
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Figure 6-6:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
6.5  Analyze Structural Response 
Now that the equivalent static loads of the blast are applied to the bridge 
model, the analysis can run.  SAP2000’s nonlinear static analysis output shows the 
performance of the structural members’ plastic hinges.  The nodes are color-coded, as 
shown in Figure 4-8, to represent the hinge’s state on the moment-rotation or force-
deformation curve.  The analysis saves multiple response steps.  Figures 6-6 through 
6-10 show the final response steps for each attack scenario.   
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Figure 6-6:  Attack Scenario 1 Response (Step 10) 
 
 
Figure 6-7:  Attack Scenario 2 Response (Step 3) 
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Figure 6-8:  Attack Scenario 3 Response (Step 2) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-9:  Attack Scenario 4 Response (Step 25) 
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Figure 6-10:  Attack Scenario 5 Response (Step 6) 
 
6.6  Consequence Assessment 
 For the continuous steel plate girder bridge, the consequences are estimated 
using the method described in Section 4.5.   
6.6.1  Structural Damage 
Figures 6-6 through 6-10 reveal that SG bridge experiences damage in all 
three performance levels.  Table 6-4 summarizes the structural damage and associated 
costs, calculated using Equations 4.2 and 4.3. 
Table 6-4:  SG Bridge Structural Damage Costs 
≥ IO ≥ LS ≥ CP Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 3,310 540 3,930 $1,206,720 $1,860,360
2 2,861 1,962 4,303 $1,439,804 $2,219,698
3 2,902 1,353 4,273 $1,362,000 $2,099,750
4 1,926 1,341 3,578 $1,135,170 $1,750,054
5 2,041 930 4,439 $1,299,420 $2,003,273
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Structural Damage Cost ($) 
(Ci,S)SG
Damaged Area by Performance Level (ft2)
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6.6.2  Casualties 
Based on the peak hour traffic data, the number of vehicles on the 606’ bridge 
at any time (Vpeak) is 40 vehicles.  Equations 4.5 and 4.6 yield the estimated cost of 
casualties, as shown in Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5:  Cost of Casualties for SG Bridge 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 17% 7 0 25,200,000
2 19% 7 0 25,200,000
3 18% 7 0 25,200,000
4 15% 6 0 21,600,000
5 19% 8 0 28,800,000
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)SG
Cost of Casualties ($)          
(Ci,C)SG
(Fi)*Vpeak 
(vehicles)
 
 
6.6.3  Downtime 
Using the Failure Ratio and bridge replacement times, Equations 4.7 and 4.8 
are used to calculate upper and lower limit of bridge downtime for each attack 
scenario, as Table 6-6 displays.  Equations 4.9 - 4.12 calculate the cost ranges for toll 
revenue loss and user delay.  The results are shown in Table 6-7. 
                         Table 6-6:  SG Bridge Downtime 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 17% 31 41
2 19% 33 45
3 18% 33 44
4 15% 28 37
5 19% 34 46
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)SG
Downtime (days)                (Di)SG
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Table 6-7:  SG Bridge Downtime Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 1,860,000 2,460,000 34,875,000 46,125,000
2 1,980,000 2,700,000 37,125,000 50,625,000
3 1,980,000 2,640,000 37,125,000 49,500,000
4 1,680,000 2,220,000 31,500,000 41,625,000
5 2,040,000 2,760,000 38,250,000 51,750,000
User Detour Cost ($)     (Ci,D2)SGAttack Scenario 
(i)
Lost Toll Revenue ($)    (Ci,D1)SG
 
 
6.6.4  Total Consequences for Steel Plate Girder Bridge 
Equations 4.15 and 4.16 calculate the expected cost of the consequences 
E[(Ci)SG] and standard deviation (σi)SG for each attack scenario.  Finally, the expected 
consequence cost, E[CSG], and standard deviation (σSG) for the steel girder bridge 
type is estimated using Equations 4.17 and 4.18.  Table 6-8 summarizes these 
consequence costs.  
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Table 6-8:  SG Bridge Consequence Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Structural Damage 1,206,720 1,860,360 1,533,540 188,690
Casualties 0 25,200,000 12,600,000 7,274,613
Downtime 36,735,000 48,585,000 42,660,000 3,420,800
E[(C1)SG] 56,793,540 8,040,987
Structural Damage 1,439,804 2,219,698 1,829,751 225,136
Casualties 0 25,200,000 12,600,000 7,274,613
Downtime 39,105,000 53,325,000 46,215,000 4,104,960
E[(C2)SG] 60,644,751 8,355,919
Structural Damage 1,362,000 2,099,750 1,730,875 212,970
Casualties 0 25,200,000 12,600,000 7,274,613
Downtime 39,105,000 52,140,000 45,622,500 3,762,880
E[(C3)SG] 59,953,375 8,192,962
Structural Damage 1,135,170 1,750,054 1,442,612 177,502
Casualties 0 21,600,000 10,800,000 6,235,383
Downtime 33,180,000 43,845,000 38,512,500 3,078,720
E[(C4)SG] 50,755,112 6,956,294
Structural Damage 1,299,420 2,003,273 1,651,346 203,185
Casualties 0 28,800,000 14,400,000 8,313,844
Downtime 40,290,000 54,510,000 47,400,000 4,104,960
E[(C5)SG] 63,451,346 9,274,265
$58,319,625 $4,334,990Expected Consequence Costs, E[CSG]
Cost ($)
Consequence
1
2
3
4
Mean ($) 
(Ci)SG
Std Dev ($) 
(σi)SG
5
i
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7.0  CASE STUDY 3:  DECK CANTILEVER TRUSS (DT) 
BRIDGE 
 
 
 
Case Study 3 demonstrates the proposed method outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 
on a three-span deck cantilever truss (DT) bridge.  Before the method’s application, 
general information about the span’s geometry, material properties, and bridge model 
is provided. 
7.1  Geometry and Material Properties 
The bridge plans were obtained by the agency responsible for the long-span 
bridge used in this study.  The bridge was designed using AASHTO’s Standard 
Specifications for Highway Bridges for an HS20-44 live load.  The representative DT 
bridge in this case study has three spans totaling 1350’ in length. There are three span 
arrangements that follow a repeating pattern:  suspended, cantilever, anchor, and 
cantilever, which are shown in Figure 7-1. 
300’ 150’ 480’ 150’ 270’ 
Suspended 
Span 
Cantilever  
Arm 
Anchor 
Span 
Cantilever 
Arm 
Suspended 
Span 
Figure 7-1:  Deck Cantilever Truss Configuration 
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7.1.1  Truss Members 
Two parallel truss structures are spaced at 28’ center-to-center, one on each 
side of the bridge’s typical section.  Within each truss, the chords, vertical members, 
and diagonals are connected at each panel point, spaced 30’ apart.  The depth of the 
truss varies from 40’ at the end of the bridge to 75’ at the interior supports.  All truss 
members are built-up plate sections, constructed of A36 carbon structural steel or 
high-strength low alloy structural steel.  The section depths and plate thicknesses vary 
from member to member.  The chords and vertical members consist of two web plates 
and two cover plates.  The diagonal and some vertical members have two flange 
plates and one web plate.  These truss member shapes are shown in Figure 7-2.  
 
Figure 7-2:  Truss Member Cross Sections 
 
 The lateral bracings and sway frames between trusses are constructed of A36 
carbon steel.  These members are rolled W-shape beams.  The top and bottom lateral 
bracing members are arranged in an X-shaped pattern and connected to each panel 
point of the main truss.  The sway frames provide further lateral stiffness by 
connecting the two main truss structures at every other panel point. 
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7.1.2  Floorbeams and Stringers 
Intermediate floorbeams connect the two parallel truss structures at each panel 
point, which is every 30’.  Six stringers are connected to the floorbeams and support 
the 6.5” lightweight concrete deck.  The stringers are spaced 7’ center-to center, 
which Figure 7-3 illustrates.  The floorbeams are W36x160 rolled beams, while the 
stringers are W24x76.  All floorbeams and stringers are constructed of A36 carbon 
structural steel.   
 88 
 
 
 89 
 
5 
S
pa
ce
s 
@
 7
’ =
 3
5’
 14
’ t
o 
B
rid
ge
 C
en
te
rli
ne
 
S
tri
ng
er
 1
 
S
tri
ng
er
 2
 
S
tri
ng
er
 3
 
S
tri
ng
er
 4
 
S
tri
ng
er
 5
 
S
tri
ng
er
 6
 
Fi
gu
re
 7
-3
:  
D
ec
k 
C
an
til
ev
er
 T
ru
ss
 T
yp
ic
al
 S
ec
tio
n 
 
7.2  Attack Scenarios 
The five attack scenarios for the deck cantilever truss bridge are restated in 
Table 7-1.  Each scenario is characterized by a charge weight of TNT and location 
along the bridge’s 1350’ length.  As explained in Chapter 4, the charge weight and 
locations were assigned probability distributions and randomly generated.   
  Table 7-1:  Attack Scenarios for DT Bridge 
Attack 
Scenario
Charge Weight 
(lbs TNT)
Blast Location Along 
Bridge Length (ft)
1 674 773
2 1009 990
3 437 290
4 2911 803
5 1821 465  
7.3  Bridge Model 
A model of the deck cantilever truss bridge is created in SAP2000.  A pre-
formatted excel spreadsheet is used to enter the 2D truss member geometry.  Then the 
spreadsheet is imported into the software to create the bridge model.  After replicating 
the imported truss panel, the member sections can be defined.  Then, the lateral 
bracing/sway frames, floor beams, and stringers are added, based on the bridge plans.  
All members are designated as frame elements. 
7.3.1  Bridge Deck 
Since this study is concerned with the response of the major structural 
elements (e.g. truss members, floorbeams, stringers, deck), the deck is also modeled 
using SAP2000 frame elements.  By defining the deck as frame elements, nonlinear 
hinges can be assigned, so the deck will exhibit nonlinear plastic behavior.  In order 
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to properly model the bridge deck and account for transverse and longitudinal 
stiffness, a grid of frame elements is created.  The deck frame elements are connected 
to the automatically generated joints along the plate girder and stringer centerlines.  
Four frame elements are defined, two in the transverse direction and two in the 
longitudinal direction.  Deck Sections 1 and 2 are in the transverse direction, while 
Deck Sections 3 and 4 are in the longitudinal direction.  Figure 7-4 shows a cross 
section of the deck frame elements. 
    
    Figure 7-4:  Deck Cantilever Truss Bridge Deck Section 
Width (varies) 
Depth 
6.5” 
 
The width of the deck sections are calculated via the tributary area method.  
First, a few distances must be defined.  The distance between stringers in the 
longitudinal direction is designated as “b” and equal to 30’ (360”).  The spacing 
between stringers is designated as “s” and equal to 7’ (84”).  The overhang distance 
between the exterior stringers and the edge of the bridge is designated as “o” and 
equal to 2’4” (28”).    
Deck Section 1 is along the end of the bridge in the transverse direction.  The 
width of this section is equal to half the distance between stringers, or b/2.  Deck 
Section 2 is also in the transverse direction, with a width equal to the spacing between 
panel points, or b.  Deck Section 3 falls in the longitudinal direction along the exterior 
stringers, so the width is defined as the overhang distance plus half the beam spacing, 
or (o + s/2).  Finally, Deck Section 4 elements are in the longitudinal direction along 
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the interior stringers, with a width equal to their center-to-center spacing, or s.  Table 
7-2 summarizes the deck frame elements used to model the bridge deck. 
Table 7-2:  DT Bridge Deck Elements 
Deck Section Direction Depth (in)
1 Transverse 7 b/2 180
2 Transverse 7 b 360
3 Longitudinal 7 o + s/2 70
4 Longitudinal 7 s 84
Width (in)
 
 
7.3.2  Completed Model 
Figure 7-5 displays a 3D view of the model for the 1350’deck cantilever truss 
bridge.  Figure 7-6 is a zoomed-in view without extruded sections. 
 
Figure 7-5:  SAP2000 Model of Deck Cantilever Truss Bridge 
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Figure 7-6:  SAP2000 Model of Deck Cantilever Truss Bridge (Zoomed In) 
 
7.4  Apply Attack Scenarios to DT Bridge Model 
Using the procedure outlined in Chapter 4, the static equivalent loads of each 
attack scenario are calculated.  Table 7-3 displays these calculations for Attack 
Scenario 1 as an example.  All five attack scenario’s calculations can be found in the 
Appendix.  First, the coordinates of the joints between deck elements are entered.  
Next, the distance (in the plane of the bridge deck) is found between the blast centroid 
and each bridge joint, denoted as X.  Using X and the height of the blast (Z) the 
distance from the blast centroid to each joint (D) and the angle of incidence (θi) is 
calculated.  Entering the values of D and θi into AT-Blast yields the static pressure at 
each joint.  Using the tributary area method, the pressure is resolved into joint loads.  
In Table 7-3, the pressures highlighted in yellow are greater than or equal to 200 psi, 
so these pressures’ corresponding joint loads will be applied to the DT bridge model. 
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Table 7-3:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Load Calculations7 
x y
1 750 17.5 29 4 29
20
19
28
26
14
13
25
24
10
9
23
82 128.05 87.45 1613
2 765 17.5 19 4 78 312.75 87.45 3938
3 780 17.5 19 4 78 306.30 87.45 3857
4 795 17.5 28 4 82 137.49 87.45 1731
1 750 10.5 25 4 81 161.43 105.00 2441
2 765 10.5 13 4 73 572.36 105.00 8654
3 780 10.5 13 4 72 668.49 105.00 10108
4 795 10.5 24 4 81 173.95 105.00 2630
1 750 3.5 23 4 80 205.34 105.00 3105
2 765 3.5 9 4 65 1567.80 105.00 23705
3 780 3.5 8 4 63 2123.15 105.00 32102
4 795 3.5 22 4 80 233.64 105.00 3533
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 
1
St
rin
ge
r 
2
St
rin
ge
r 
3
 
 
 
 Figure 7-7 shows the static equivalent joint loads for Attack Scenario 1 
applied to the deck cantilever truss model.  Figures for all five attack scenario’s 
loading can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 7-7:  Attack Scenario 1 (674 lbs TNT) Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
                                                 
7 Because of the bridge’s typical section symmetry, the load calculations for Stringer 1, Stringer 2, and 
Stringer 3 also apply to Stringer 4, Stringer 5, and Stringer 6, respectively. 
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7.5  Analyze Structural Response 
Now that the equivalent static loads of the blast are applied to the bridge 
model, the analysis is run.  SAP2000’s nonlinear static analysis output shows the 
performance of the structural members’ plastic hinges.  The nodes are color-coded, as 
shown in Figure 4-8, to represent the hinge’s state on the moment-rotation or force-
deformation curve.  The analysis saved multiple response steps.  Figures 7-8 through 
7-12 show the final response steps for each attack scenario on the deck truss bridge. 
 
 
Figure 7-8:  Attack Scenario 1 Response (Step 2) 
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Figure 7-9:  Attack Scenario 2 Response (Step 3) 
 
 
 
Figure 7-10:  Attack Scenario 3 Response (Step 13) 
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Figure 7-11:  Attack Scenario 4 Response (Step 2) 
 
 
 
Figure 7-12:  Attack Scenario 5 Response (Step 4) 
 
 
7.6  Consequence Assessment 
For the deck cantilever truss bridge, the consequences are estimated using the 
method described in Section 4.5. 
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7.6.1  Structural Damage 
Figures 7-8 through 7-12 reveal that DT bridge experiences damage in all 
three performance levels.  Table 7-4 summarizes the structural damage and associated 
costs, calculated using Equations 4.2 and 4.3. 
Table 7-4:  DT Bridge Structural Damage Costs 
≥ IO ≥ LS ≥ CP Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 4,759 - 5,949 $2,498,580 $3,640,788
2 1,190 - 4,759 $1,769,758 $2,578,790
3 2,380 7,139 8,329 $4,372,725 $6,371,685
4 3,569 1,190 4,759 $2,186,188 $3,185,588
5 - - 3,569 $1,249,290 $1,820,394
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Structural Damage Cost ($) 
(Ci,S)DT
Damaged Area by Performance Level (ft2)
 
7.6.2  Casualties 
Based on the peak hour traffic data, the number of vehicles on the 1350’ 
bridge at any time (Vpeak) is 90 vehicles.  Equations 4.5 and 4.6 yield the estimated 
cost of casualties, as shown in Table 7-5. 
             Table 7-5:  Cost of Casualties for DT Bridge 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 11% 10 0 36,000,000
2 9% 8 0 28,800,000
3 16% 14 0 50,400,000
4 9% 8 0 28,800,000
5 7% 6 0 21,600,000
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)DT
Cost of Casualties ($)           
(Ci,C)DT
(Fi)*Vpeak 
(vehicles)
 
 
7.6.3  Downtime 
Using the Failure Ratio and bridge replacement times, Equations 4.7 and 4.8 
are used to calculate upper and lower limit of bridge downtime for each attack 
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scenario, as Table 7-6 displays.  Equations 4.9 - 4.12 calculate the cost ranges for toll 
revenue loss and user delay.  The results are shown in Table 7-7. 
           Table 7-6:  DT Bridge Downtime 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 11% 47 53
2 9% 37 43
3 16% 65 75
4 9% 37 43
5 7% 28 32
Attack 
Scenario 
(i)
Failure Ratio 
(Fi)DT
Downtime (days)                (Di)DT
 
 
 
Table 7-7:  DT Bridge Downtime Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2,820,000 3,180,000 52,875,000 59,625,000
2 2,220,000 2,580,000 41,625,000 48,375,000
3 3,900,000 4,500,000 73,125,000 84,375,000
4 2,220,000 2,580,000 41,625,000 48,375,000
5 1,680,000 1,920,000 31,500,000 36,000,000
User Detour Cost ($)     (Ci,D2)DTAttack Scenario 
(i)
Lost Toll Revenue ($)    (Ci,D1)DT
 
 
7.6.4  Total Consequences for Deck Cantilever Truss Bridge 
Equations 4.15 and 4.16 calculate the expected cost of the consequences 
E[(Ci)DT] and standard deviation (σi)DT for each attack scenario.  Finally, the expected 
consequence cost, E[CDT], and standard deviation (σDT) for the deck truss bridge type 
is estimated using Equations 4.17 and 4.18.  Table 7-8 summarizes these consequence 
costs.  
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Table 7-8:  DT Bridge Consequence Costs 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Structural Damage 2,498,580 3,640,788 3,069,684 329,727
Casualties 0 36,000,000 18,000,000 10,392,305
Downtime 55,695,000 62,805,000 59,250,000 2,052,480
E[(C1)DT] 80,319,684 10,598,179
Structural Damage 1,769,758 2,578,790 2,174,274 233,547
Casualties 0 28,800,000 14,400,000 8,313,844
Downtime 43,845,000 50,955,000 47,400,000 2,052,480
E[(C2)DT] 63,974,274 8,566,634
Structural Damage 4,372,725 6,371,685 5,372,205 577,050
Casualties 0 50,400,000 25,200,000 14,549,227
Downtime 77,025,000 88,875,000 82,950,000 3,420,800
E[(C3)DT] 113,522,205 14,957,101
Structural Damage 2,186,188 3,185,588 2,685,888 288,502
Casualties 0 28,800,000 14,400,000 8,313,844
Downtime 43,845,000 50,955,000 47,400,000 2,052,480
E[(C4)DT] 64,485,888 8,568,308
Structural Damage 1,249,290 1,820,394 1,534,842 164,864
Casualties 0 21,600,000 10,800,000 6,235,383
Downtime 33,180,000 37,920,000 35,550,000 1,368,320
E[(C5)DT] 47,884,842 6,385,881
$74,037,378 $22,248,466
Mean ($) 
(Ci)DT
Std Dev ($) 
(σi)DT
5
i
Expected Consequence Costs, E[CDT]
Cost ($)
Consequence
1
2
3
4
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
8.1  Study Results 
 
 This study analyzes and quantifies the effects of a blast event occurring on a 
highway bridge deck.  The proposed method uses nonlinear structural analysis, 
probability distributions, and performance level criteria to calculate the expected 
costs of three consequences:  structural damage, casualties, and downtime.  Three 
case studies using different functional bridge types are completed by implementing 
the proposed method.   
Table 8-1 displays the damaged area in square feet by performance level for 
each bridge type.  Table 8-2 summarizes the average results for the applied attack 
scenarios.  Table 8-3 breaks down the expected value of costs by consequence type 
for each bridge. 
Table 8-1:  Structural Damage Summary 
≥ IO ≥ LS ≥ CP
60' Prestressed Concrete Beam 0 0 2,380
606' Steel Plate Girder 2,608 1,225 4,105
1350' Deck Cantilever Truss 2,975 4,165 5,473
Bridge Type and Length
Mean Damaged Area by Performance Level (ft2)
 
Table 8-2:  Results Summary 
Bridge Type and Length Mean Failure Ratio, F 
Expected Value 
of Consequence 
Cost, E[C]  
Standard 
Deviation, σ  
60' Prestressed Concrete Beam 100% $114,397,400 - 
606' Steel Plate Girder 18% $58,319,625 $4,334,990
1350' Deck Cantilever Truss 10% $74,037,378 $22,248,466
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Table 8-3:  Expected Value of Costs by Consequence Type 
Structural 
Damage, CS
Casualties, CC Downtime, CD
60' Prestressed Concrete Beam $547,400 $7,200,000 $106,650,000
606' Steel Plate Girder $1,637,625 $12,600,000 $44,082,000
1350' Deck Cantilever Truss $2,967,378 $16,560,000 $54,510,000
Bridge Type and Length
Expected Value of Consequence ($)
 
 
 Table 8-2 shows that the prestressed concrete beam bridge has the highest 
expected value of consequences.  However, this is not because of the structural 
damage.  Table 8-3 sheds light on this result by breaking down the costs by 
consequence type.  It is clear that the PC beam bridge’s downtime cost 
($106,650,000) controls.  The steel girder and deck truss bridges have higher 
structural damage and casualty costs; however, since they only require local 
replacement, the required downtime is less than the prestressed concrete bridge.     
8.2  Recommended Areas of Future Research 
 
 In closing, the author would like to suggest areas of future research that could 
build onto this study.   
1. The attack scenarios in the case studies are manually applied to each bridge 
model.  Developing user-defined code to automate this process would allow 
more simulations to be completed in a more time-efficient manner. 
2. More research could better define the relationship between structural damage 
and bridge replacement cost. 
3. Official guidelines, perhaps through a national effort by FEMA, for 
performance-based design criteria for blast loads are needed. 
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4. Large-scale laboratory testing, although costly, would be valuable in 
determining the effects of conventional explosives on bridges. 
5. In this study, the costs of casualties and downtime are solely dependent on the 
amount of damaged area in or above the Collapse Prevention performance 
level.  More research could provide a better understanding of these 
consequences in the other performance levels. 
6. The method demonstration only analyzes the effect of conventional explosives 
over the bridge deck (carried in a vehicle on the bridge).  Further research 
could analyze other weapon and delivery method used by terrorists. 
7. The “next generation” seismic performance-based guidelines use analytical 
models to assess economic consequences.  As of now, input data required to 
apply this concept to blasts limited.  More research could assist this effort. 
8. Uniform and triangular probability distributions are assigned in this study for 
demonstration purposes.  Characterizing the attack scenarios and 
consequences with more fitting distributions would decrease uncertainty. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 38 4 39
30
23
19
19
24
32
36
27
18
12
13
20
28
34
25
15
7
8
17
27
34
25
15
7
8
17
27
36
27
18
12
13
20
28
39
30
23
19
19
24
32
84 59.19 27.50 234
2 10 17.92 30 4 82 119.43 55.00 946
3 20 17.92 23 4 80 233.64 55.00 1850
4 30 17.92 18 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
5 40 17.92 19 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
6 50 17.92 24 4 81 197.09 55.00 1561
7 60 17.92 32 4 83 100.12 27.50 396
1 0 10.75 36 4 84 73.51 35.83 379
2 10 10.75 26 4 81 150.43 71.67 1552
3 20 10.75 18 4 77 321.06 71.67 3313
4 30 10.75 11 4 71 784.48 71.67 8096
5 40 10.75 12 4 72 668.49 71.67 6899
6 50 10.75 19 4 78 306.30 71.67 3161
7 60 10.75 28 4 82 137.49 35.83 709
1 0 3.58 34 4 83 86.82 35.83 448
2 10 3.58 24 4 81 173.95 71.67 1795
3 20 3.58 14 4 75 472.39 71.67 4875
4 30 3.58 5 4 53 7869.88 71.67 81217
5 40 3.58 7 4 60 3487.37 71.67 35990
6 50 3.58 16 4 76 365.83 71.67 3775
7 60 3.58 26 4 81 150.43 35.83 776
1 0 -3.58 34 4 83 86.82 35.83 448
2 10 -3.58 24 4 81 173.95 71.67 1795
3 20 -3.58 14 4 75 472.39 71.67 4875
4 30 -3.58 5 4 53 7869.88 71.67 81217
5 40 -3.58 7 4 60 3487.37 71.67 35990
6 50 -3.58 16 4 76 365.83 71.67 3775
7 60 -3.53 26 4 81 150.43 35.83 776
1 0 -10.75 36 4 84 73.51 35.83 379
2 10 -10.75 26 4 81 150.43 71.67 1552
3 20 -10.75 18 4 77 321.06 71.67 3313
4 30 -10.75 11 4 71 784.48 71.67 8096
5 40 -10.75 12 4 72 668.49 71.67 6899
6 50 -10.75 19 4 78 306.30 71.67 3161
7 60 -10.75 28 4 82 137.49 35.83 709
1 0 -17.92 38 4 84 59.19 27.50 234
2 10 -17.92 30 4 82 119.43 55.00 946
3 20 -17.92 23 4 80 233.64 55.00 1850
4 30 -17.92 18 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
5 40 -17.92 19 4 78 312.75 55.00 2477
6 50 -17.92 24 4 81 197.09 55.00 1561
7 60 -17.92 32 4 83 100.12 27.50 396
PC
 B
ea
m
 1
PC
 B
ea
m
 2
PC
 B
ea
m
 3
PC
 B
ea
m
 6
PC
 B
ea
m
 4
PC
 B
ea
m
 5
 
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Table A-2:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 48 4 48
39
30
23
19
19
24
45
36
27
18
12
13
20
44
34
25
15
7
8
17
44
34
25
15
7
8
17
45
36
27
18
12
13
20
48
39
30
23
19
19
24
85 48.71 27.50 193
2 10 17.92 38 4 84 84.33 55.00 668
3 20 17.92 30 4 82 156.51 55.00 1240
4 30 17.92 23 4 80 290.26 55.00 2299
5 40 17.92 18 4 78 364.94 55.00 2890
6 50 17.92 19 4 78 364.94 55.00 2890
7 60 17.92 24 4 81 272.50 27.50 1079
1 0 10.75 45 4 85 57.04 35.83 294
2 10 10.75 36 4 84 101.57 71.67 1048
3 20 10.75 26 4 81 207.45 71.67 2141
4 30 10.75 18 4 77 413.48 71.67 4267
5 40 10.75 11 4 71 971.44 71.67 10025
6 50 10.75 12 4 72 834.12 71.67 8608
7 60 10.75 19 4 78 330.79 35.83 1707
1 0 3.58 44 4 85 60.49 35.83 312
2 10 3.58 34 4 83 118.77 71.67 1226
3 20 3.58 24 4 81 261.06 71.67 2694
4 30 3.58 14 4 75 598.24 71.67 6174
5 40 3.58 5 4 53 9648.34 71.67 99571
6 50 3.58 7 4 60 4251.71 71.67 43878
7 60 3.58 16 4 76 469.70 35.83 2424
1 0 -3.58 44 4 85 60.49 35.83 312
2 10 -3.58 34 4 83 118.77 71.67 1226
3 20 -3.58 24 4 81 261.06 71.67 2694
4 30 -3.58 14 4 75 598.24 71.67 6174
5 40 -3.58 5 4 53 9648.34 71.67 99571
6 50 -3.58 7 4 60 4251.71 71.67 43878
7 60 -3.53 16 4 76 469.70 35.83 2424
1 0 -10.75 45 4 85 57.04 35.83 294
2 10 -10.75 36 4 84 101.57 71.67 1048
3 20 -10.75 26 4 81 207.45 71.67 2141
4 30 -10.75 18 4 77 413.48 71.67 4267
5 40 -10.75 11 4 71 971.44 71.67 10025
6 50 -10.75 12 4 72 834.12 71.67 8608
7 60 -10.75 19 4 78 330.79 35.83 1707
1 0 -17.92 48 4 85 48.71 27.50 193
2 10 -17.92 38 4 84 84.33 55.00 668
3 20 -17.92 30 4 82 156.51 55.00 1240
4 30 -17.92 23 4 80 290.26 55.00 2299
5 40 -17.92 18 4 78 364.94 55.00 2890
6 50 -17.92 19 4 78 364.94 55.00 2890
7 60 -17.92 24 4 81 272.50 27.50 1079
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
PC
 B
ea
m
 1
PC
 B
ea
m
 2
PC
 B
ea
m
 3
PC
 B
ea
m
 6
PC
 B
ea
m
 4
PC
 B
ea
m
 5
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Table A-3:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 22 4 22
19
20
25
33
41
50
17
12
13
21
29
39
48
14
6
9
18
28
37
47
14
6
9
18
28
37
47
17
12
13
21
29
39
48
22
19
20
25
33
41
50
80 175.26 27.50 694
2 10 17.92 18 4 78 284.21 55.00 2251
3 20 17.92 19 4 78 242.83 55.00 1923
4 30 17.92 25 4 81 132.02 55.00 1046
5 40 17.92 32 4 83 63.90 55.00 506
6 50 17.92 41 4 84 37.34 55.00 296
7 60 17.92 50 4 85 24.52 27.50 97
1 0 10.75 17 4 77 315.40 35.83 1627
2 10 10.75 11 4 70 630.70 71.67 6509
3 20 10.75 13 4 73 504.91 71.67 5211
4 30 10.75 20 4 79 206.72 71.67 2133
5 40 10.75 29 4 82 91.91 71.67 949
6 50 10.75 39 4 84 41.85 71.67 432
7 60 10.75 48 4 85 26.56 35.83 137
1 0 3.58 13 4 73 440.48 35.83 2273
2 10 3.58 5 4 49 10023.32 71.67 103441
3 20 3.58 8 4 63 1710.17 71.67 17649
4 30 3.58 17 4 77 304.12 71.67 3139
5 40 3.58 27 4 82 99.90 71.67 1031
6 50 3.58 37 4 84 47.22 71.67 487
7 60 3.58 47 4 85 27.68 35.83 143
1 0 -3.58 13 4 73 440.48 35.83 2273
2 10 -3.58 5 4 49 10023.32 71.67 103441
3 20 -3.58 8 4 63 1710.17 71.67 17649
4 30 -3.58 17 4 77 304.12 71.67 3139
5 40 -3.58 27 4 82 99.90 71.67 1031
6 50 -3.58 37 4 84 47.22 71.67 487
7 60 -3.53 47 4 85 27.68 35.83 143
1 0 -10.75 17 4 77 315.40 35.83 1627
2 10 -10.75 11 4 70 630.70 71.67 6509
3 20 -10.75 13 4 73 504.91 71.67 5211
4 30 -10.75 20 4 79 206.72 71.67 2133
5 40 -10.75 29 4 82 91.91 71.67 949
6 50 -10.75 39 4 84 41.85 71.67 432
7 60 -10.75 48 4 85 26.56 35.83 137
1 0 -17.92 22 4 80 175.26 27.50 694
2 10 -17.92 18 4 78 284.21 55.00 2251
3 20 -17.92 19 4 78 242.83 55.00 1923
4 30 -17.92 25 4 81 132.02 55.00 1046
5 40 -17.92 32 4 83 63.90 55.00 506
6 50 -17.92 41 4 84 37.34 55.00 296
7 60 -17.92 50 4 85 24.52 27.50 97
PC
 B
ea
m
 1
PC
 B
ea
m
 2
PC
 B
ea
m
 3
PC
 B
ea
m
 6
PC
 B
ea
m
 4
PC
 B
ea
m
 5
 
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Table A-4:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 40 4 40
32
24
19
19
23
30
38
28
20
13
12
18
27
36
27
17
8
7
15
25
36
27
17
8
7
15
25
38
28
20
13
12
18
27
40
32
24
19
19
23
30
84 176.11 27.50 697
2 10 17.92 32 4 83 278.72 55.00 2207
3 20 17.92 24 4 81 435.43 55.00 3449
4 30 17.92 19 4 78 677.50 55.00 5366
5 40 17.92 18 4 78 677.50 55.00 5366
6 50 17.92 23 4 80 468.68 55.00 3712
7 60 17.92 30 4 82 296.44 27.50 1174
1 0 10.75 38 4 84 201.65 35.83 1041
2 10 10.75 28 4 82 326.92 71.67 3374
3 20 10.75 19 4 78 623.02 71.67 6430
4 30 10.75 12 4 72 1413.21 71.67 14584
5 40 10.75 11 4 71 1622.29 71.67 16742
6 50 10.75 18 4 77 756.27 71.67 7805
7 60 10.75 26 4 81 350.41 35.83 1808
1 0 3.58 36 4 84 232.61 35.83 1200
2 10 3.58 26 4 81 350.41 71.67 3616
3 20 3.58 16 4 76 846.12 71.67 8732
4 30 3.58 7 4 60 6989.00 71.67 72126
5 40 3.58 5 4 53 15886.79 71.67 163952
6 50 3.58 14 4 75 1044.84 71.67 10783
7 60 3.58 24 4 81 404.37 35.83 2087
1 0 -3.58 36 4 84 232.61 35.83 1200
2 10 -3.58 26 4 81 350.41 71.67 3616
3 20 -3.58 16 4 76 846.12 71.67 8732
4 30 -3.58 7 4 60 6989.00 71.67 72126
5 40 -3.58 5 4 53 15886.79 71.67 163952
6 50 -3.58 14 4 75 1044.84 71.67 10783
7 60 -3.53 24 4 81 404.37 35.83 2087
1 0 -10.75 38 4 84 201.65 35.83 1041
2 10 -10.75 28 4 82 326.92 71.67 3374
3 20 -10.75 19 4 78 623.02 71.67 6430
4 30 -10.75 12 4 72 1413.21 71.67 14584
5 40 -10.75 11 4 71 1622.29 71.67 16742
6 50 -10.75 18 4 77 756.27 71.67 7805
7 60 -10.75 26 4 81 350.41 35.83 1808
1 0 -17.92 40 4 84 176.11 27.50 697
2 10 -17.92 32 4 83 278.72 55.00 2207
3 20 -17.92 24 4 81 435.43 55.00 3449
4 30 -17.92 19 4 78 677.50 55.00 5366
5 40 -17.92 18 4 78 677.50 55.00 5366
6 50 -17.92 23 4 80 468.68 55.00 3712
7 60 -17.92 30 4 82 296.44 27.50 1174
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
PC
 B
ea
m
 1
PC
 B
ea
m
 2
PC
 B
ea
m
 3
PC
 B
ea
m
 6
PC
 B
ea
m
 4
PC
 B
ea
m
 5
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Table A-5:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 0 17.92 28 4 28
21
18
20
26
34
43
24
16
12
15
22
31
41
22
12
5
10
20
29
39
22
12
5
10
20
29
39
24
16
12
15
22
31
41
28
21
18
20
26
34
43
82 277.62 27.50 1099
2 10 17.92 21 4 79 426.20 55.00 3376
3 20 17.92 18 4 77 585.76 55.00 4639
4 30 17.92 20 4 79 465.20 55.00 3684
5 40 17.92 26 4 81 296.42 55.00 2348
6 50 17.92 34 4 83 181.69 55.00 1439
7 60 17.92 43 4 85 103.44 27.50 410
1 0 10.75 24 4 80 325.52 35.83 1680
2 10 10.75 15 4 75 744.45 71.67 7683
3 20 10.75 11 4 70 1336.41 71.67 13792
4 30 10.75 14 4 74 846.62 71.67 8737
5 40 10.75 22 4 80 383.67 71.67 3959
6 50 10.75 31 4 83 235.12 71.67 2426
7 60 10.75 40 4 84 118.25 35.83 610
1 0 3.58 21 4 79 391.35 35.83 2019
2 10 3.58 12 4 71 1302.15 71.67 13438
3 20 3.58 4 4 43 23749.68 71.67 245097
4 30 3.58 10 4 68 1924.59 71.67 19862
5 40 3.58 19 4 78 476.61 71.67 4919
6 50 3.58 29 4 82 268.05 71.67 2766
7 60 3.58 39 4 84 131.86 35.83 680
1 0 -3.58 21 4 79 391.35 35.83 2019
2 10 -3.58 12 4 71 1302.15 71.67 13438
3 20 -3.58 4 4 43 23749.68 71.67 245097
4 30 -3.58 10 4 68 1924.59 71.67 19862
5 40 -3.58 19 4 78 476.61 71.67 4919
6 50 -3.58 29 4 82 268.05 71.67 2766
7 60 -3.53 39 4 84 131.86 35.83 680
1 0 -10.75 24 4 80 325.52 35.83 1680
2 10 -10.75 15 4 75 744.45 71.67 7683
3 20 -10.75 11 4 70 1336.41 71.67 13792
4 30 -10.75 14 4 74 846.62 71.67 8737
5 40 -10.75 22 4 80 383.67 71.67 3959
6 50 -10.75 31 4 83 235.12 71.67 2426
7 60 -10.75 40 4 84 118.25 35.83 610
1 0 -17.92 28 4 82 277.62 27.50 1099
2 10 -17.92 21 4 79 426.20 55.00 3376
3 20 -17.92 18 4 77 585.76 55.00 4639
4 30 -17.92 20 4 79 465.20 55.00 3684
5 40 -17.92 26 4 81 296.42 55.00 2348
6 50 -17.92 34 4 83 181.69 55.00 1439
7 60 -17.92 43 4 85 103.44 27.50 410
PC
 B
ea
m
 1
PC
 B
ea
m
 2
PC
 B
ea
m
 3
PC
 B
ea
m
 6
PC
 B
ea
m
 4
PC
 B
ea
m
 5
 
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Figure A-1:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-2:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-3:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-4:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-5:  PC Beam Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-6:  Plate Girder Elevation
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Table A-6:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
35 312.75 18.58 39 4 39
31
24
20
20
24
31
39
37
29
21
15
15
21
28
37
35
26
17
9
9
17
26
35
34
25
15
6
6
15
25
34
84 59.19 27.98 239
36 322.5 18.58 31 4 83 107.86 27.98 435
37 332.25 18.58 24 4 80 205.34 27.98 827
38 342 18.58 19 4 78 306.30 27.98 1234
39 351.75 18.58 19 4 78 306.30 27.98 1234
40 361.5 18.58 24 4 80 205.34 27.98 827
41 371.25 18.58 31 4 83 107.86 27.98 435
42 381 18.58 39 4 84 59.19 25.00 213
35 312.75 14 37 4 84 68.22 56.45 555
36 322.5 14 28 4 82 128.05 56.45 1041
37 332.25 14 20 4 79 290.81 56.45 2364
38 342 14 15 4 75 472.39 56.45 3840
39 351.75 14 15 4 75 472.39 56.45 3840
40 361.5 14 20 4 79 290.81 56.45 2364
41 371.25 14 28 4 82 137.49 56.45 1118
42 381 14 37 4 84 68.22 50.43 495
35 312.75 7 35 4 83 81.09 68.25 797
36 322.5 7 25 4 81 161.43 68.25 1587
37 332.25 7 16 4 76 365.83 68.25 3595
38 342 7 9 4 65 1833.63 68.25 18021
39 351.75 7 8 4 65 1833.63 68.25 18021
40 361.5 7 16 4 76 365.83 68.25 3595
41 371.25 7 25 4 81 161.43 68.25 1587
42 381 7 35 4 83 81.09 60.97 712
35 312.75 0 34 4 83 86.82 68.25 853
36 322.5 0 25 4 81 173.85 68.25 1709
37 332.25 0 15 4 75 472.39 68.25 4643
38 342 0 5 4 51 11320.26 68.25 111256
39 351.75 0 5 4 50 12000.89 68.25 117945
40 361.5 0 15 4 75 472.39 68.25 4643
41 371.25 0 24 4 81 173.95 68.25 1710
42 381 0 34 4 83 86.82 60.97 762
St
rin
ge
r 1
Pl
at
e 
G
ird
er
 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Table A-7:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
46 413.5 18.58 36 4 36
28
22
19
21
26
33
41
43
34
26
18
15
17
23
31
39
41
32
22
14
8
11
19
28
37
40
31
12
4
9
18
27
36
46
84 101.57 27.27 399
47 423 18.58 28 4 82 182.96 27.41 722
48 432.6 18.58 22 4 80 296.90 27.55 1178
49 442.2 18.58 19 4 78 364.94 27.55 1448
50 451.8 18.58 20 4 79 306.90 27.55 1218
51 461.4 18.58 25 4 81 232.97 27.55 924
52 471 18.58 33 4 83 126.52 26.95 491
53 480.18 18.58 41 4 84 74.41 26.35 282
45 404 14 42 4 85 64.25 49.71 460
46 413.5 14 34 4 83 118.77 55.01 941
47 423 14 25 4 81 232.97 55.29 1855
48 432.6 14 18 4 78 403.81 55.58 3232
49 442.2 14 14 4 74 614.27 55.58 4917
50 451.8 14 16 4 76 469.70 55.58 3760
51 461.4 14 22 4 80 290.26 55.58 2323
52 471 14 30 4 83 144.14 54.37 1128
53 480.18 14 39 4 84 84.33 53.15 645
45 404 7 41 4 84 74.41 60.095 644
46 413.5 7 31 4 83 134.96 66.5 1292
47 423 7 22 4 80 296.90 66.85 2858
48 432.6 7 13 4 73 719.57 67.2 6963
49 442.2 7 7 4 61 3811.33 67.2 36881
50 451.8 7 10 4 69 1181.61 67.2 11434
51 461.4 7 19 4 78 364.94 67.2 3531
52 471 7 28 4 82 182.96 65.73 1732
53 480.18 7 37 4 84 95.32 64.26 882
45 404 0 40 4 84 79.50 60.095 688
46 413.5 0 31 4 83 144.14 66.5 1380
48 432.6 0 11 4 71 971.44 67.2 9400
49 442.2 0 2 4 24 32291.50 67.2 312478
50 451.8 0 8 4 63 2572.80 67.2 24896
51 461.4 0 17 4 77 413.48 67.2 4001
52 471 0 27 4 82 203.52 65.73 1926
53 480.18 0 36 4 84 101.57 64.26 940
54 489.36 0 45 4 85 53.88 64.295 499
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
St
rin
ge
r 1
Pl
at
e 
G
ird
er
 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
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Table A-8:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
12 98.27 18.58 37 4 37
29
23
19
20
24
31
39
35
27
20
15
15
21
28
37
42
33
24
16
9
9
17
26
35
41
32
23
14
6
6
15
25
34
44
84 147.65 26.35 560
13 107.45 18.58 29 4 82 268.05 26.36 1018
14 116.64 18.58 23 4 80 353.05 26.36 1340
15 125.82 18.58 19 4 78 521.48 26.35 1978
16 135 18.58 19 4 78 476.61 26.95 1850
17 144.6 18.58 24 4 80 325.02 27.55 1290
18 154.2 18.58 31 4 83 235.12 27.55 933
19 163.8 18.58 39 4 84 131.86 27.55 523
12 98.27 14 35 4 83 167.94 53.15 1285
13 107.45 14 27 4 81 290.53 53.18 2225
14 116.64 14 19 4 78 476.61 53.18 3650
15 125.82 14 15 4 75 824.53 53.15 6311
16 135 14 15 4 75 824.53 54.37 6455
17 144.6 14 20 4 79 426.20 55.58 3411
18 154.2 14 28 4 82 277.62 55.58 2222
19 163.8 14 37 4 84 147.65 55.58 1182
11 89.09 7 42 4 84 112.10 64.26 1037
12 98.27 7 32 4 83 197.45 64.26 1827
13 107.45 7 24 4 80 325.52 64.295 3014
14 116.64 7 15 4 75 744.45 64.295 6892
15 125.82 7 8 4 64 3138.30 64.26 29040
16 135 7 9 4 65 2908.67 65.73 27531
17 144.6 7 16 4 76 659.49 67.2 6382
18 154.2 7 25 4 81 296.42 67.2 2868
19 163.8 7 35 4 83 167.94 67.2 1625
11 89.09 0 41 4 84 118.25 64.26 1094
12 98.27 0 32 4 83 215.15 64.26 1991
13 107.45 0 23 4 80 353.05 64.295 3269
14 116.64 0 13 4 73 982.45 64.295 9096
15 125.82 0 4 4 46 21050.34 64.26 194788
16 135 0 5 4 51 18331.72 65.73 173512
17 144.6 0 15 4 75 824.53 67.2 7979
18 154.2 0 24 4 81 300.72 67.2 2910
19 163.8 0 34 4 83 181.69 67.2 1758
20 173.4 0 43 4 85 98.15 67.2 950
St
rin
ge
r 1
Pl
at
e 
G
ird
er
 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Table A-9:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
35 312.75 18.58 52 4 52
43
34
27
21
19
22
28
34
40
47
50
41
32
24
17
15
18
25
31
38
45
49
39
30
21
12
8
13
22
29
36
44
58
48
39
29
19
10
4
11
20
28
36
43
53
86 94.04 27.98 379
36 322.5 18.58 43 4 85 147.15 27.98 593
37 332.25 18.58 34 4 83 260.77 27.98 1051
38 342 18.58 27 4 81 350.41 27.98 1412
39 351.75 18.58 21 4 79 560.49 27.98 2258
40 361.5 18.58 19 4 78 677.50 27.98 2730
41 371.25 18.58 21 4 79 517.68 27.98 2086
42 381 18.58 27 4 82 326.92 25.00 1177
43 388.67 18.58 33 4 83 260.77 22.00 826
44 396.33 18.58 40 4 84 176.11 22.00 558
45 404 18.58 47 4 85 120.56 24.64 428
35 312.75 14 50 4 85 104.76 56.45 852
36 322.5 14 41 4 84 165.39 56.45 1344
37 332.25 14 32 4 83 278.72 56.45 2266
38 342 14 24 4 80 435.43 56.45 3540
39 351.75 14 17 4 77 826.80 56.45 6721
40 361.5 14 14 4 74 998.19 56.45 8114
41 371.25 14 17 4 77 756.27 56.45 6148
42 381 14 24 4 81 404.37 50.43 2937
43 388.67 14 31 4 83 287.15 44.38 1835
44 396.33 14 38 4 84 201.65 44.38 1289
45 404 14 45 4 85 132.95 49.71 952
35 312.75 7 49 4 85 109.69 68.25 1078
36 322.5 7 39 4 84 188.28 68.25 1850
37 332.25 7 30 4 82 296.44 68.25 2913
38 342 7 20 4 79 560.49 68.25 5508
39 351.75 7 12 4 71 1622.39 68.25 15945
40 361.5 7 7 4 60 6989.00 68.25 68688
41 371.25 7 12 4 72 1413.21 68.25 13889
42 381 7 21 4 79 517.68 60.97 4545
43 388.67 7 29 4 82 305.43 53.655 2360
44 396.33 7 36 4 84 232.61 53.655 1797
45 404 7 44 4 85 139.81 60.095 1210
34 303 0 58 4 86 72.84 68.25 716
35 312.75 0 48 4 85 114.95 68.25 1130
36 322.5 0 39 4 84 188.28 68.25 1850
37 332.25 0 29 4 82 305.43 68.25 3002
38 342 0 19 4 78 677.50 68.25 6658
39 351.75 0 9 4 67 2621.96 68.25 25769
40 361.5 0 1 4 7 59366.49 68.25 583454
41 371.25 0 10 4 69 1947.05 68.25 19136
42 381 0 20 4 79 608.11 60.97 5339
43 388.67 0 28 4 82 326.92 53.655 2526
44 396.33 0 35 4 84 232.61 53.655 1797
45 404 0 43 4 85 147.15 60.095 1273
46 413.5 0 53 4 86 90.02 66.5 862
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
St
rin
ge
r 1
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at
e 
G
ird
er
 1
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ge
r 2
St
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ge
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Table A-10:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
20 173.4 18.58 40 4 40
32
25
20
19
21
25
32
40
38
22
16
15
17
22
30
38
37
27
18
11
8
12
18
27
36
36
26
17
8
4
9
16
26
36
84 124.81 27.55 495
21 183 18.58 32 4 83 215.15 27.41 849
22 192.5 18.58 25 4 81 300.72 27.27 1181
23 202 18.58 20 4 79 465.20 24.64 1651
24 209.67 18.58 19 4 78 521.48 22.00 1652
25 217.33 18.58 20 4 79 426.20 22.00 1350
26 225 18.58 25 4 81 300.72 25.00 1082
27 234.75 18.58 32 4 83 215.15 27.98 867
28 244.5 18.58 40 4 84 124.81 27.98 503
20 173.4 14 38 4 84 139.46 55.58 1116
22 192.5 14 22 4 80 383.67 55.01 3039
23 202 14 16 4 76 727.83 49.71 5210
24 209.67 14 14 4 74 846.62 44.38 5411
25 217.33 14 16 4 76 649.49 44.38 4151
26 225 14 21 4 79 391.35 50.43 2842
27 234.75 14 29 4 82 258.06 56.45 2098
28 244.5 14 38 4 84 139.46 56.45 1134
20 173.4 7 36 4 84 147.65 67.2 1429
21 183 7 27 4 82 286.47 66.85 2758
22 192.5 7 18 4 77 585.76 66.5 5609
23 202 7 10 4 68 1686.58 60.095 14595
24 209.67 7 7 4 60 5649.73 53.655 43652
25 217.33 7 11 4 70 1336.41 53.655 10326
26 225 7 17 4 77 585.76 60.97 5143
27 234.75 7 27 4 81 290.53 68.25 2855
28 244.5 7 36 4 84 156.49 68.25 1538
20 173.4 0 36 4 84 156.49 67.2 1514
21 183 0 26 4 81 296.42 66.85 2853
22 192.5 0 17 4 76 659.49 66.5 6315
23 202 0 7 4 60 5649.73 60.095 48891
24 209.67 0 1 4 10 47361.20 53.655 365928
25 217.33 0 8 4 64 3138.30 53.655 24248
26 225 0 16 4 76 727.83 60.97 6390
27 234.75 0 26 4 81 296.42 68.25 2913
28 244.5 0 36 4 84 156.49 68.25 1538
St
rin
ge
r 1
Pl
at
e 
G
ird
er
 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
Load on 
Joint (K)
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Figure A-7:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-8:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-9:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-10:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-11:  SG Bridge Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Table A-11:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 750 17.5 29 4 29
20
19
28
26
14
13
25
24
10
9
23
82 128.05 87.45 1613
2 765 17.5 19 4 78 312.75 87.45 3938
3 780 17.5 19 4 78 306.30 87.45 3857
4 795 17.5 28 4 82 137.49 87.45 1731
1 750 10.5 25 4 81 161.43 105.00 2441
2 765 10.5 13 4 73 572.36 105.00 8654
3 780 10.5 13 4 72 668.49 105.00 10108
4 795 10.5 24 4 81 173.95 105.00 2630
1 750 3.5 23 4 80 205.34 105.00 3105
2 765 3.5 9 4 65 1567.80 105.00 23705
3 780 3.5 8 4 63 2123.15 105.00 32102
4 795 3.5 22 4 80 233.64 105.00 3533
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 
1
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ge
r 
2
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r 
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Table A-12:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 960 17.5 35 4 35
23
18
23
35
32
19
11
19
32
30
16
5
16
30
83 111.23 87.45 1401
2 975 17.5 23 4 80 290.26 87.45 3655
3 990 17.5 18 4 77 413.48 87.45 5207
4 1005 17.5 23 4 80 290.26 87.45 3655
5 1020 17.5 35 4 83 111.23 87.45 1401
1 960 10.5 32 4 83 134.96 105.00 2041
2 975 10.5 18 4 78 364.94 105.00 5518
3 990 10.5 11 4 69 1181.61 105.00 17866
4 1005 10.5 18 4 78 364.94 105.00 5518
5 1020 10.5 32 4 83 134.96 105.00 2041
1 960 3.5 30 4 82 156.51 105.00 2366
2 975 3.5 15 4 75 535.11 105.00 8091
3 990 3.5 4 4 41 18319.39 105.00 276989
4 1005 3.5 15 4 75 535.11 105.00 8091
5 1020 3.5 30 4 82 156.51 105.00 2366
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
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Table A-13:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 270 17.5 27 4 27
19
21
31
23
12
15
27
21
7
11
26
81 111.54 87.45 1405
2 285 17.5 18 4 78 284.21 87.45 3579
3 300 17.5 20 4 79 206.72 87.45 2603
4 315 17.5 31 4 83 76.09 87.45 958
1 270 10.5 23 4 80 160.65 105.00 2429
2 285 10.5 12 4 71 614.53 105.00 9292
3 300 10.5 15 4 75 360.58 105.00 5452
4 315 10.5 27 4 82 108.91 105.00 1647
1 270 3.5 20 4 79 206.72 105.00 3126
2 285 3.5 6 4 57 4443.51 105.00 67186
3 300 3.5 11 4 69 760.19 105.00 11494
4 315 3.5 25 4 81 122.10 105.00 1846
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 
1
St
rin
ge
r 
2
St
rin
ge
r 
3
 
 
 
Table A-14:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 765 17.5 42 4 42
29
20
19
28
41
40
26
14
13
25
39
38
24
10
9
23
37
85 155.01 87.45 1952
2 780 17.5 29 4 82 305.43 87.45 3846
3 795 17.5 19 4 78 623.02 87.45 7846
4 810 17.5 19 4 78 677.50 87.45 8532
5 825 17.5 28 4 82 326.92 87.45 4117
6 840 17.5 41 4 84 165.39 87.45 2083
1 765 10.5 39 4 84 176.11 105.00 2663
2 780 10.5 25 4 81 376.13 105.00 5687
3 795 10.5 13 4 73 1237.55 105.00 18712
4 810 10.5 13 4 72 1413.21 105.00 21368
5 825 10.5 24 4 81 404.37 105.00 6114
6 840 10.5 38 4 84 188.28 105.00 2847
1 765 3.5 38 4 84 201.65 105.00 3049
2 780 3.5 23 4 80 435.43 105.00 6584
3 795 3.5 9 4 65 3113.57 105.00 47077
4 810 3.5 8 4 63 4142.24 105.00 62631
5 825 3.5 22 4 80 469.68 105.00 7102
6 840 3.5 37 4 84 216.36 105.00 3271
Pressure 
(psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin
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Table A-15:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Load Calculations 
x y
1 435 17.5 35 4 35
23
18
23
35
32
19
11
19
32
30
16
5
16
30
83 167.94 87.45 2115
2 450 17.5 23 4 80 353.05 87.45 4446
3 465 17.5 18 4 77 585.76 87.45 7376
4 480 17.5 23 4 80 353.05 87.45 4446
5 495 17.5 35 4 83 167.94 87.45 2115
1 435 10.5 32 4 83 181.69 105.00 2747
2 450 10.5 18 4 78 521.48 105.00 7885
3 465 10.5 11 4 69 1570.27 105.00 23742
4 480 10.5 18 4 78 521.48 105.00 7885
5 495 10.5 32 4 83 181.69 105.00 2747
1 435 3.5 30 4 82 258.06 105.00 3902
2 450 3.5 15 4 75 744.45 105.00 11256
3 465 3.5 4 4 41 24226.71 105.00 366308
4 480 3.5 15 4 75 744.45 105.00 11256
5 495 3.5 30 4 82 258.06 105.00 3902
Load on 
Joint (K)θi (º)
Joint 
No. X (ft) Z (ft) D (ft)
Coord. Relative 
to Origin Pressure (psi)
Tributary 
Area (ft2)
St
rin
ge
r 1
St
rin
ge
r 2
St
rin
ge
r 3
 
 
 
 
Figure A-12:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 1 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-13:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 2 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-14:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 3 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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Figure A-15:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 4 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
 
 
 
Figure A-16:  DT Bridge Attack Scenario 5 Static Equivalent Joint Loads 
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